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Towards an Understanding of 
Litigation as Expression: Lessons 
from Guantánamo 
Kathryn A. Sabbeth∗ 
Civil rights litigation has been recognized for over fifty years as core 
First Amendment activity, but governments often censor indirectly that 
which they cannot censor outright. In the War on Terrorism, the U.S. 
government has imposed indirect burdens on First Amendment freedoms 
and access to courts. This Article explores prior Supreme Court 
jurisprudence interpreting litigation as political expression and asks to 
what extent this doctrine can survive today. The Article focuses on the 
chilling effects of the Terrorist Surveillance Program (“TSP”), a 
warrantless wiretapping program imposed shortly after 9/11. Prior 
literature on the TSP has focused largely on individual rights protected by 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, but this Article highlights the 
First Amendment values at stake and, in particular, examines the First 
Amendment implications of wiretapping lawyers. Rather than utilize 
existing First Amendment theory to interpret the effects of the TSP, 
however, this Article turns the inquiry around. Drawing on a case study of 
twenty-three Guantánamo lawyers who believe they were targeted for 
surveillance, the Article explores the First Amendment theory of litigation 
as expression. The Article concludes that attorneys’ communications in 
support of litigation reflect fundamental First Amendment values tied to 
political expression, but implementing protection for lawyers’ 
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communications presents significant doctrinal challenges, particularly 
with respect to defining the scope of litigation to be recognized as political 
and the type of communications to be included within the constitutional 
protection. The Article proposes a five-factor test to assist courts with 
identifying litigation that qualifies as political expression and proposes 
future research on the implications of recognizing First Amendment values 
in lawyers’ work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Providing “expert advice or assistance” to a terrorist organization 
constitutes a federal crime.1 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,2 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this restriction as 
applied to two U.S. citizens and six human rights organizations that 
had, inter alia, offered training in the negotiation of peace agreements 
and preparation of petitions to the United Nations.3 The Court ruled 
that this statutory ban violated none of the plaintiffs’ free speech or 
association rights.4 
A question the Supreme Court did not reach, though the Ninth 
Circuit had considered it below,5 was whether the language of the 
statute prohibited the filing of an amicus brief.6 It is not surprising 
that the Court steered clear of such territory. Had the Court upheld a 
prohibition on litigation by political organizations advocating for civil 
rights, it would have run into conflict with NAACP v. Button7 and its 
progeny,8 under which, for more than half a century, it has been well 
settled that such advocacy is highly protected as core First 
Amendment activity. 
As others have demonstrated, however, government actors often 
censor indirectly that which they cannot forbid outright, and in 
periods of war and national anxiety, such actors have historically 
restricted civil liberties and access to courts.9 In this Article, I explore 
the notion of litigation as political expression, a notion that the Court 
previously developed to protect the advocacy of the NAACP and 
ACLU, and I ask whether and to what extent this doctrine can survive 
the current pressures of national security. I suggest that attorneys’ 
communications in support of litigation reflect fundamental First 
Amendment values tied to political expression, but implementing 
 
 
1 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2010); id. § 2339B(a)(1). 
2 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
3 Id. at 2713, 2720, 2729. 
4 Id. at 2730-31. 
5 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2009). 
6 Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2719. 
7 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-31 (1963). 
8 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426-32 (1978). 
9 See Tamar R. Birckhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the Uncertain 
Future of the Right to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14-26 (2006) (describing 
evolution of political repression from World War I to War on Terrorism); David Cole, 
The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1, 4-15 (2003) (same). 
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protection for lawyers’ communications presents a number of 
doctrinal challenges. 
To explore this concept, I examine the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program (“TSP”), a warrantless wiretapping program that has not 
outlawed First Amendment activities but has significantly chilled 
them. Almost immediately after September 11, 2001, President George 
W. Bush launched a series of warrantless surveillance programs, which 
came to be known collectively as the TSP, and authorized the National 
Security Agency (“NSA”) to engage in electronic monitoring of 
communications without judicial review.10 Widespread controversy 
erupted after the TSP became public in 2005, and, three years later, 
then-Senator Barack Obama campaigned as one of its critics.11 Today, 
however, the Obama administration refuses to take a position on the 
constitutionality of the TSP, and, further, it argues that no court 
should be able to rule on this question.12 Prior literature on the TSP 
and other post-9/11 wiretapping programs has focused primarily on 
individual rights protected by the Fourth,13 Fifth,14 and Sixth 
Amendments,15 but, as the Supreme Court has noted, “dread of 
 
10 See President George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005) 
(transcript on file with New York Times), [hereinafter Bush Radio Address] available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/17/politics/17text-bush.html?_r=1. 
11 See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, U.S. Wiretapping of Limited Value, Officials 
Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A1; Anne Broache, Obama: No Warrantless 
Wiretaps If You Elect Me, CNET NEWS, Jan. 8, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301- 
10784_3-9845595-7.html. 
12 Transcript of Proceedings at 5-7, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-4726) (transcript on file with author); Christine Kearney, Obama 
Lawyer Says No Position on Bush-Era Wiretaps, REUTERS, Oct. 9, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5985I720091009?feedType=RSS&feedName= 
politicsNews (reporting on comments at oral argument). 
13 See, e.g., Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic 
Surveillance of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 587-99 (2008) (arguing TSP violates Fourth Amendment); 
Wilson R. Huhn, Congress Has the Power to Enforce the Bill of Rights Against the Federal 
Government; Therefore FISA Is Constitutional and the President’s Terrorist Surveillance 
Program Is Illegal, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 537, 564-75 (2007) (same); see also Teri 
Dobbins, Protecting the Unpopular from the Unreasonable: Warrantless Monitoring of 
Attorney Client Communications in Federal Prisons, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 295, 329-46 
(2004) (analyzing monitoring by Bureau of Prisons). 
14 For a discussion exploring the Fifth Amendment right to due process and to 
counsel, see Kristen V. Cunningham & Jessica L. Srader, The Post 9-11 War on 
Terrorism . . . What Does It Mean for the Attorney-Client Privilege?, 4 WYO. L. REV. 311 
(2004). 
15 A number of critics focusing on the monitoring of attorney-client 
communications in federal prisons have argued that such monitoring interferes with 
the attorney-client privilege and violates criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment 
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subjection to an unchecked [government] surveillance power” can 
hamper both private and public expression and the exchange of 
ideas.16 
This Article focuses on the First Amendment interests at stake in the 
TSP17 and, in particular, examines the First Amendment implications 
of wiretapping lawyers. Rather than utilize existing First Amendment 
theory to interpret the effects of the TSP, however, I turn the inquiry 
around. Drawing on a case study of twenty-three Guantánamo lawyers 
who believe they were targeted for surveillance, I use this example to 
explore the possibilities for a First Amendment theory of litigation as 
expression. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief review of the 
design of the American adversary system. Part II draws an analogy 
between the philosophical underpinnings of the adversary system and 
core philosophies underlying freedom of speech. Part III reviews 
Supreme Court doctrine protecting litigation as political expression 
and lawyers as those who make that expression effective. Part IV 
introduces the case study of Guantánamo lawyers threatened with 
warrantless surveillance. This part describes the surveillance, details 
 
rights. See Birckhead, supra note 8, at 2-6; Avidan Y. Cover, A Rule Unfit for All 
Seasons: Monitoring Attorney-Client Communications Violates Privilege and the Sixth 
Amendment, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1244-55 (2002); Chris Ford, Fear of a 
Blackened Planet: Pressured by the War on Terror, Courts Ignore the Erosion of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege Effective Assistance of Counsel in 28 C.F.R.§ 50.3(D) Cases, 12 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 51, 53-54 (2006); see also Martin R. Gardner, 
The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Underlying Values: Defining the Scope of 
Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 464-65 (2000). Terri Dobbins 
points to the need for an analysis beyond Sixth Amendment theory because large 
numbers of persons, such as material witnesses and persons arrested but not formally 
charged, are subject to monitoring but not entitled to Sixth Amendment rights. See 
Dobbins, supra note 13, at 338. 
16 United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972); see id. at 313 
(“National security cases . . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth 
Amendment values.”); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) 
(discussing potential chilling effects of electronic eavesdropping); United States v. 
DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (distinguishing systematic, 
public monitoring from isolated incident and stating that totalitarian system of 
monitoring would necessarily interfere with freedom of communication). 
17 See ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(ruling that TSP violated First and Fourth Amendments, separation of powers, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act), rev’d, 
ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing case for 
lack of standing); Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue Over Government Surveillance?, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 71, 78-79 (2009) (identifying privacy and First Amendment effects of 
TSP); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and 
Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 162 (2004). 
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its effects on the lawyers’ communications, and identifies the impact 
on the litigation in which they have been engaged. Part V draws on the 
Guantánamo case study to further the theory of litigation as political 
expression. It highlights five factors, reflected in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and the Guantánamo example, that help to define the 
category of litigation that ought to be recognized as political 
expression. Part V also considers additional questions about the scope 
of communications to be protected. The Article concludes with 
remarks regarding potential implications of recognizing First 
Amendment values in lawyers’ work. 
 
I. BACKDROP OF AMERICAN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
In the American court system, the development of the case is largely 
the responsibility of the parties. Lawyers are capable of and 
responsible for investigations as officers of the court.18 The judiciary 
generally does not conduct its own fact-finding but instead relies on 
the adversaries to exchange evidence and then bring relevant facts and 
legal arguments to the attention of the court.19 This distinguishes the 
American judiciary from other branches of the U.S. government20 and 
from courts in other nations, which take an inquisitorial approach.21 
Both American common law and federal rules of procedure and 
evidence have developed to aid the lawyer in performing her 
obligations as a zealous advocate.22 A catalogue of all such features of 
the adversary system is beyond the scope of this Article and 
unnecessary to develop a theory of litigation as First Amendment 
activity. As an entry point to the constitutional discussion, this section 
of the Article will focus on the protections for attorney 
communications. 
The American legal system has historically provided varying degrees 
of protection for the privacy of lawyers’ communications with clients, 
 
 
18 See e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (defining rules of discovery process); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 45(a)(3) (granting attorneys power to issue and sign subpoenas as officers of court). 
19 See, e.g., Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The Search for 
Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 
INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185, 207-10 (Fall 2001 – Spring 2002). Judges and clerks may 
conduct legal research beyond that which is included in parties’ briefs, but courts 
generally rule on the arguments presented and do not issue advisory opinions. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22 See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and 
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 30, 36-38 (1978). 
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co-counsel, and others in the course of representation.23 The oldest 
and strongest form of protection is the common law attorney-client 
privilege, which, since the sixteenth century, has prevented the 
government and other parties from compelling lawyers or clients to 
testify about their communications with one another.24 Unless 
waived,25 this privilege is generally understood to be an absolute and 
inviolate rule of evidence that extends beyond communications 
between the attorney and client, and includes the attorney’s 
communications with other parties when they reflect communications 
between the attorney and client.26 
Underlying the attorney-client privilege is the belief that a promise 
of privacy encourages candor in communications, which enhances 
lawyers’ representation of their clients.27 The premise is that by 
encouraging the free flow of information, the privilege helps the 
advocate prepare fully and develop complete cognizance of the 
strengths and weaknesses in her client’s case.28 While David Luban 
 
23 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The [attorney-
client] privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and 
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the 
client.”) (citations omitted). 
24 See FED. R. EVID. 501. Professor Wigmore’s well-known formulation of the 
attorney-client privilege is as follows: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) 
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications 
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his 
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) except the protection be waived. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 
2292, at 554 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961). 
25 There are various ways a client can waive the privilege. Notably, many 
commentators interpret the crime-fraud exception, pursuant to which 
communications made to facilitate a crime or fraud are not covered by the privilege, as 
a waiver. The rationale is that, if one abuses the relationship, the relationship is no 
longer serving its intended purpose, and the privilege disappears. See, e.g., Clark v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“[T]he privilege takes flight if the relation is 
abused.”). 
26 See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney 
Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of the Facts 
Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 1005 (1999). 
27 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 386-91 (John W. Strong ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
28 Some scholarship has suggested that the privilege protects intrinsic values of 
dignity and liberty, in addition to serving the instrumentalist goal of encouraging the 
exchange of information. The intrinsic value argument has particular appeal in the 
criminal context, where, absent the privilege, confiding in a lawyer could be 
tantamount to self-incrimination. See, e.g., Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed 
Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 485-87 (1977) 
(asserting that combination of Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel create constitutional right to attorney-client 
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and Deborah Rhode have raised interesting questions about the 
empirical validity of the assumption that the privilege increases 
candor,29 this assumption remains a foundational principle of the 
American adversary system. 
In 1946, the Supreme Court added the work product doctrine,30 
which, in the modern discovery system, exempts material prepared in 
anticipation of litigation from compelled disclosure.31 In the discovery 
rules, Congress codified the Supreme Court’s earlier insight: 
It is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of 
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties 
and their counsel. . . . That is the historical and the necessary 
way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system 
of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients’ 
interests.32 
In addition to aiding the acquiring of factual information, the work 
product doctrine creates a safe space for testing out ideas before 
presenting them to courts. The doctrine reflects a degree of respect for 
the lawyer’s creative process; even its name conveys high regard for 
the fruits of the attorney’s labor.33 Such respect rests on the view that 
helping to protect and polish the lawyer’s work improves the 
 
privilege for criminal defendants). Yet this does not explain why the doctrine pervades 
civil litigation, nor why one’s communications with one’s attorney should receive 
stronger protections that those with one’s doctor, clergy, or spouse. See Benjamin H. 
Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 453, 465 (2008). 
29 See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 242-44 (5th ed. 2009) 
(highlighting absence of empirical work demonstrating that privilege increases 
candor). 
30 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
32 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. 
33 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (explaining that attorney 
work product doctrine plays a vital role “in assuring the proper functioning of the 
criminal justice system . . . . The interests of society and the accused in obtaining a fair 
and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate 
safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the 
case.”); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he purpose of 
the work-product immunity has been to avoid chilling attorneys in developing 
materials to aid them in giving legal advice and in preparing a case for trial. The fear 
of disclosure to adversaries of normal work-product would severely affect 
performance of the lawyer’s role . . . .”); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 
F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1967) (observing that attorney work product doctrine is 
“designed to encourage effective legal representation by removing counsel’s fear that 
his thoughts and information will be invaded by his adversary if he records them”). 
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adversary process. While the work product doctrine is not 
impermeable,34 courts have attributed great significance to it, 
suggesting that compromising it even slightly could chill attorneys’ 
thoughts, undermine attorneys’ ability to perform their professional 
role, and potentially threaten the functioning of the adversary 
system.35 
As reflected in the Court’s work product jurisprudence, the 
predominant rationale for the privacy shield is that preserving a zone 
of privacy improves the quality of the American justice system. One 
might reasonably ask why the advocate’s work is accorded such high 
status. Criminal cases raise a special set of constitutional 
considerations, but even in civil litigation we seem to place a premium 
on the creation of conditions under which lawyers can do their best 
work. Particularly in the face of countervailing considerations, such as 
societal needs for information that would aid the search for truth or 
promote the public safety, why do we pride ourselves on blocking the 
release of information in the name of perfecting the lawyer’s craft? 
Why do we maintain such reverence for the adversary system and 
those whose work supports it? The answer I propose is that the 
protections for the American adversary system reflect core First 
Amendment values. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES OF LITIGATION 
For the purpose of simplicity, I divide justifications for protecting 
freedom of speech into three general categories: (1) individual 
autonomy; (2) pursuit of truth; and (3) promotion of democratic 
government. Below, I compare the primary values underlying the First 
Amendment with those promoted in the adversary system. Daniel 
Markovits has noted that the protection of individual rights and the 
pursuit of truth parallel First Amendment theories.36 I suggest that the 
value of self-government is particularly important to the structure of 
the American court system. 
 
34 The doctrine “permits disclosure of documents and tangible things constituting 
attorney work product upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the 
equivalent without undue hardship,” but “accords special protection to work product 
revealing the attorney’s mental processes.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 
400 (1981). 
35 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
36 See Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1382 (2006) (suggesting justifications of adversary advocacy 
parallel those of democracy). 
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A. Individual Autonomy 
Some theorists describe free speech as an intrinsically valuable 
aspect of individual liberty.37 Under this view, freedom of expression 
embodies not merely a positive enactment to advance some 
conception of the good, but a pre-political entitlement based in 
personal autonomy and free development of one’s faculties.38 Speech 
has a core value based in individual self-realization39 and control over 
one’s own reasoning process.40 While the autonomy value is most 
often associated with the right of the speaker to express herself, it also 
protects the listener, whose access to information assists her in making 
personal decisions.41 
Just as many interpret free speech as a fundamental liberty interest, 
the most basic defense of the American court system is that this 
structure is uniquely protective of the rights, dignity, and autonomy of 
the individual.42 The role of defense counsel is to serve as the client’s 
“zealous advocate against the government itself,” and counsel’s 
obligations of investigation and disclosure are defined almost entirely 
in service of that role.43 Some scholars interpret the maintenance of 
the adversary system as inherently valuable.44 They explain that the 
structure of the system “keep[s] sound and wholesome the procedure 
by which society visits its condemnation on an erring member.”45 
Criminal defense attorneys and scholars emphasize the inherent value 
of working to “police the police, audit the government, [and] . . . fight 
for fairness.”46 
 
37 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); 
see also C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989). 
38 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 
(1982). 
39 Id. 
40 See David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory 
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62-63 (1974); David A. Strauss, 
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991). 
41 See Redish, supra note 38, at 593-94. 
42 MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2 (1975). 
43 MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 20-21 
(2002). 
44 Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint 
Conference, 44 AM. B. ASS’N J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958). 
45 Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 35 (H. 
Berman ed., 1960). 
46 Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of 
People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 957 & n.158 (2000) (citations 
omitted). 
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Critiques of the individualist free speech philosophy align with 
critiques of individualist justifications for the adversary system. Some 
First Amendment theorists point out that self-fulfillment may derive 
from activities other than speech, and speech should not be assumed 
to have a uniquely fundamental relationship to self-actualization.47 
One might make a similar comment on the individualist approach to 
our legal system: it rationalizes the system as respectful of the 
individual’s autonomy but assumes the client’s autonomy as a person 
is inextricable from that of her legal case. Perhaps the more one 
accepts the notion that verbal expression is fundamental to the 
development and exercise of rational capacities, the more one will be 
inclined to interpret both freedom of speech and the adversary system 
as reflecting intrinsic values of human dignity.48 Moreover, while the 
structure of the system may protect criminal defendants’ due process 
rights,49 the process of civil litigation does not necessarily include 
comparable safeguards. On the contrary, without access to lawyers 
with time for adequate representation, many indigent litigants, both 
civil and criminal, find their experience in the adversary process quite 
disrespectful of their basic dignity.50 
 
B. Pursuit of Truth 
The well-known philosophy of the “marketplace of ideas” suggests 
that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.”51 John Stuart Mill and 
others have argued that robust dialogue promotes the pursuit of 
truth.52 Individual expression is protected so that messages may enter 
the stream of discussion, and people may make better, more informed 
choices. Ultimately the dissemination of more ideas is expected to lead 
to true or socially good ones. Under this approach, the value of free 
 
47 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1971). 
48 See also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 589, 611-12 (1985) [hereinafter Ethical Perspectives]; Richard Wasserstrom, 
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1-14 (1975), reprinted in 
RHODE AND LUBAN, supra note 29, at 138. 
49 Smith, supra note 46, at 957 & n.158 (citations omitted). 
50 See Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 48, at 611-12 (suggesting 
partisanship loses social value on individualist grounds when partisans are allocated 
by market forces). 
51 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
52 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rappaport ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 1998) (1859). 
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speech is purely instrumentalist: the right of the speaker to express 
herself receives even less emphasis than that of the listener to hear the 
message communicated. Notably, the truth-seeking philosophy leaves 
room to permit government restrictions of false, coercive, or abusive 
speech, which does not aid the truth-seeking function. 
The second classic argument for supporting the adversary system 
and lawyers’ work within it is that they promote the public search for 
truth. As discussed earlier, American courts rely on parties to 
investigate and present their own cases to an impartial tribunal. Many 
believe that this is the best process to ferret out an accurate picture of 
events.53 This approach reflects the assumption that a clash of parties’ 
self-interests will lead to a better result than would be reached if a 
single government actor maintained the responsibility and power to 
conduct investigations.54 
In this way, the adversarial model mimics the philosophy of the 
marketplace of ideas.55 Comparable to the free speech philosophy that 
rests on the assumption that the dissemination of more ideas will lead 
to true or socially good ones, the adversary system is premised on the 
notion that litigation will lead to truth and substantive (as well as 
procedural) justice. The courtroom is understood as a place for 
divergent ideas and evidence to be tested so truth may emerge.56 The 
role of the advocate in this system is to present facts and arguments 
that challenge the other side and direct the court’s focus. Just as 
citizens’ expression is protected so messages may work their way into 
the stream of discussion and society can make informed choices, the 
 
53 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975); Monroe H. Freedman, 
Professional Responsibilities of the Civil Practitioner, in EDUCATION IN THE PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 151, 152 (D. Weckstein ed., 1970); Fuller, supra note 
45; E. Allen Lind, John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Discovery and Presentation of 
Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1143-44 
(1973). Some point out that numerous rules of procedure, based on both statutes and 
the U.S. Constitution, block truth from reaching the forum. While rules based on 
individual rights and notions of fairness do regularly trump the need for truth, their 
presence does not necessarily disprove the role of truth as a motivating factor for the 
design of the system. As just one example, the privilege against self-incrimination may 
function to exclude a confession from court, but perhaps the underlying rationale, 
beyond a notion of due process, dignity, or burdens, is a concern about coerced 
confessions by innocent parties. 
54 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 69-77 (1988) 
(suggesting that international comparison reveals flaws in American system); W. 
Bradley Wendel, Lawyers as Quasi-Public Actors, 45 ALBERTA L. REV. 83 (2008) 
(comparing common law with civil law systems). 
55 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 52. 
56 See Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government 
Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 865-68 (2002). 
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lawyer’s ability to acquire and safeguard information and ideas is 
protected so that the decision-maker benefits from fully developed 
presentations of facts and theories by at least two different 
perspectives. 
The main flaw in the marketplace outlook can also be identified in 
the adversary system.57 A laissez-faire approach to freedom of speech 
disproportionally represents the views of those with economic and 
political power.58 Similarly, the inequality of access to courts, lawyers, 
and resources supporting those lawyers can make faith in the system’s 
ability to create substantive justice appear naive or disingenuous.59 
Additionally, many of the rules of evidence and procedure protect 
strategy and gamesmanship more than full revelation of true facts. Just 
as the actors in the free market of ideas may lack full information or 
make choices for irrational reasons, so too may the fact-finder in 
American courts. Even assuming the accuracy of the adversary system 
as a truth-seeking model, one might point out that the actual 
administration of the American system is riddled with flaws that 
interfere with its capacity as a truth producer. 
 
C. Promotion of Self-Government 
While the design of the adversary system does reflect the values of 
respect for individual autonomy and promotion of the search for truth, 
the system also rests on a third rationale — one which has been 
advanced in defense of freedom of speech but not fully explored as a 
basis for the American legal system. This third value is democratic 
self-governance. This interpretation emphasizes the place of the First 
Amendment in the body of the Constitution as a whole. It highlights 
the self-governing role that the Constitution grants to “We the 
People.” As First Amendment scholars have noted, political speech 
may have particular value because, like a town meeting, it facilitates 
public participation in, shaping of, and restrictions on government. 
The self-governing value has two related strands: (1) improving the 
quality of governance by the people, and (2) facilitating the process of 
citizen participation regardless of substantive outcomes. 
 
57 See Markovits, supra note 36, at 1391. 
58 See, e.g. OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY 
USES OF STATE POWER 31-46 (1996); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of 
Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1984). 
59 David Udell & Rebekah Diller, Access to Justice: Opening the Courthouse Door 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. AT N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW (2007), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/297f4fabb202470c67_3vm6i6ar9.pdf. 
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The first strand resembles the marketplace of ideas,60 in that it aims 
to provide a means for better ideas to rise to the top, but it privileges 
ideas related to the political sphere. To inform voting and other acts of 
civic participation, democratic citizens need a right to exercise their 
voices and to hear the voices of others. Because political speech 
improves self-government, such speech receives the highest level of 
First Amendment protection. 
This approach receives particular support from theorists like 
Vincent Blasi, for whom the principal purpose of the First Amendment 
is to facilitate a check on governmental abuses of power.61 If the 
essential function of the First Amendment is to give people the tools 
to restrict the government’s power, facilitating criticisms of 
government action becomes paramount. For Blasi, rights to acquire 
information therefore deserve recognition.62 Citizens with specialized 
abilities to understand, disseminate, or respond to information take on 
a special role in this constitutional scheme.63 
The second strand of thought on self-government takes a far less 
elitist stance. It emphasizes the First Amendment value of facilitating 
citizen participation. This perspective resembles the autonomy 
framework, in that it incorporates an individual right of expression, 
yet the goal is the process of deliberation by the people. Under this 
view, all citizens have an equal right to participate in and influence 
public discourse. The polity benefits from the diversity of views, not 
simply because the diversity generates the best ideas, but because the 
communicative process is itself essential to a healthy democracy. 
 
60 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (highlighting 
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS 
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT at x-xiii (1948). 
61 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) [hereinafter Checking Value]; see also Vincent Blasi, 
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449-50 
(1985) (“[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first 
amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of 
unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most 
likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other words, should be 
targeted for the worst of times.”); see Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First 
Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1989). 
62 Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 610 (“[T]he key stage of the checking 
process is the initial acquisition of information.”). 
63 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 253 (1961); see also Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 541-42, 547-48; 
Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 2353, 2368 (2000). 
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Applying this framework, the design of the adversary system reflects 
the value of democratic governance.64 The court system increases 
public participation in civic discourse and improves self-governance.65 
As Robert Tsai emphasized in his insightful piece, Conceptualizing 
Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A Speech- 
Centered Theory of Court Access,66 the adversary system encourages 
expression of ideas from parties representing at least two different 
views and, thus, promotes a diversity of perspectives. Moreover, the 
court provides a forum for presenting those ideas directly to judges, 
who embody a branch of government.67 The adjudicative process 
allows a back-and-forth exchange between the parties and the court.68 
The judiciary must respond to complaints from the public; when a 
judge faces a live controversy, she must resolve it one way or the 
other. When the judge issues a decision, she creates case law, and, 
whether the proceeding is large or small, any litigation that results in a 
published opinion involves the public in shaping the law. Certainly, 
the majority of decisions do not result in published opinions, but, 
even in those cases, the public has set in motion a decision that carries 
the force of law and orders social relations, even if only between the 
parties and only to preserve the status quo.69 
Tsai interprets constitutional litigation as a form of politically 
dissident speech.70 He highlights the significance of allowing an 
individual member of the public to file a formal complaint criticizing 
government action.71 Indeed, in accordance with Blasi’s emphasis on 
the checking value of First Amendment activity,72 litigants do set in 
 
64 One might also suggest that, like the expression of dissent, adjudication offers a 
peaceful method of solving social problems. See Markovits, supra note 36, at 1386. 
65 See Tsai, supra note 56, at 840-51 (describing how court process reflects free 
speech values); Judith Resnick, Courts and Democracy: The Production and 
Reproduction of Constitutional Conflict 8 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 164, 2008), available at papers.ssrn.com/ 
sd3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148202 (describing courts as democratic institutions 
required to hear different views and provide “venues for debating and developing 
norms”); see also SEYLA BENHABIB, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic 
Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE 
POLITICAL 67, 79-80 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996); Fuller, supra note 45, at 35. 
66 Tsai, supra note 56. 
67 Id. 
68 See Fuller, supra note 45. 
69 Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court 
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 388 & nn.157-58 (2010). 
70 Tsai, supra note 56, passim. 
71 Id. at 871. 
72 See Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 527. 
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motion the process by which the judiciary checks excesses by other 
government actors.73 At the same time, although Tsai describes the 
court as an almost radical institution that permits ordinary people to 
speak truth directly to power,74 parties in constitutional litigation 
rarely speak directly to judges — they usually speak through their 
attorneys. 
This raises a question about the role of lawyers’ speech in the 
adversary system.75 If the adversary system provides a forum for 
expression that serves the same values as those underlying the First 
Amendment, it becomes useful to consider the degree of protection 
that should be recognized for the lawyer’s speech in support of her 
adversary role. Further, if the adversary system provides special 
opportunities for self-government and democratic participation, 
perhaps speech in support of litigation ought to receive heightened 
protection as political expression. In the next part, I consider Supreme 
Court doctrine that initiates this inquiry. 
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO LAWYERS’ SPEECH IN 
SUPPORT OF LITIGATION 
Proposing to extend First Amendment protection to speech in 
support of litigation relies on the premise that the litigation itself is a 
form of in-court speech that can reasonably be accorded full First 
Amendment protection. An objection could be made that any freedom 
of expression in the courtroom could not be absolute. Procedural and 
evidentiary rules, as well as judicial discretion, will impose limits on 
time, subject matter, whether to have argument or briefing on certain 
issues, or whether certain cases will be heard at all. Christopher Peters 
suggests that restrictions on what he terms “adjudicative speech” are 
necessary to preserve the opportunity for all litigants to participate 
fully and fairly in the decision-making process.76 
Yet these rules may fairly be developed like time, place, and manner 
restrictions necessary for safety and order. The acceptance of 
restrictions on some speech to maintain an environment for diverse 
viewpoints may be analogized to curtailing hate speech to increase 
public dialogue including minority voices. Similarly, proponents of the 
 
73 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001). 
74 Tsai, supra note 56, at 871. 
75 Tsai mentions that, under his theory of court access as political speech, lawyers 
maintain an independent expressive interest, but he does not elaborate on this 
suggestion. Id. at 889. 
76 Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 705, 791 (2004). 
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marketplace of ideas viewpoint might staunchly protect speech that 
aids the flow of information while still limiting false or coercive 
statements, which do not aid decision-making. The existence of some 
limits on courtroom speech does not necessarily indicate that courts 
are a site where interests in expression are diminished; the limits 
could reflect the contrary.77 
Scholars and members of the Supreme Court have debated whether 
lawyers’ speech should receive lower protection than that of ordinary 
citizens’, because of its commercial element,78 or instead heightened 
protection because of lawyers’ important role in the adversary 
system.79 One seminal case addressed whether states may more sharply 
limit lawyers’ speech for the purpose of protecting the adversary 
system.80 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,81 the Supreme Court of 
Nevada disciplined a lawyer for making a statement to the press 
regarding an ongoing case. Although the State of Nevada alleged no 
“clear and present danger” of actual prejudice, it claimed the lawyer 
“knew or should have known” his statement had a “substantial 
likelihood” of materially prejudicing the trial of his client. The U.S. 
Supreme Court had previously mandated the “clear and present 
 
77 See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 315, 335 (2008) (highlighting uniqueness of litigation as form of speech for 
forum analysis); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 477- 
78 (2004) (highlighting tradition of courts as forums for expressing controversial 
viewpoints and communicating with larger public). 
78 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 
557, 563-65 (1980) (identifying intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech); 
see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1995) (interpreting 
attorney advertisements as commercial speech subject to intermediate scrutiny 
pursuant to Central Hudson); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985) (holding that disclosure requirements for attorney advertisements require 
only reasonable connection to state’s interest in protecting consumers from 
deception). 
79 See W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 
306 (2001) (highlighting competing interests). For an excellent summary of the 
contradiction in the law regarding the level of protection for attorney speech, see 
Kathleen Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints 
on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569-70 (1998). Sullivan 
suggests, though she does not develop the idea, that lawyer speech might have special 
authority because of the special knowledge or insight provided by the training. Id.; see 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the 
First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 872-74 (1998) (arguing that lower scrutiny of 
restrictions on lawyer speech is unconstitutional condition on bar membership, and 
lawyer’s speech is protected by First Amendment because it advances societal 
interests). 
80 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1031-32 (1991). 
81 Id. at 1062-76. 
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danger” standard for regulation of the press during pending 
proceedings, but in Gentile it distinguished restrictions on lawyers’ 
statements to the press as deserving a lower standard of scrutiny. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained: “Membership in the bar is a 
privilege burdened with conditions.”82 Although the Court ultimately 
ruled that the statute in Gentile was unconstitutionally vague, some 
might assert that, following Gentile, lawyers’ speech receives a lower 
level of protection than that of ordinary citizens. 
A more nuanced interpretation of Gentile can be drawn from Peters’s 
theory of adjudicative speech. It is not that lawyers categorically 
sacrifice their constitutional protections, but rather that the Court 
prioritizes adjudicative speech over other forms. When speech outside 
the courtroom can interfere with speech within, the Court gives 
precedence to protecting the exchange of ideas within the judicial 
system.83 In this sense, the lawyer engaged in litigation might receive 
full First Amendment protection necessary to further litigation, but if 
her communication could compromise that litigation, it might take a 
backseat to adjudicative priorities. One might disagree with the 
Court’s assessment that the attorney’s comments to the press in Gentile 
threatened to harm the ongoing proceeding; given that the attorney 
was responding to earlier publicity that could have prejudiced his 
client’s trial, one might interpret the facts in the opposite light.84 
Either way, the underlying principle is the same: courts will protect 
and allow other government actors to protect adjudicative speech. 
The Court’s ambivalence about the regulation of lawyers’ speech is 
more pronounced in its split decisions on attorney advertising.85 The 
Court has struggled to draw lines between in-person solicitation and 
mailed advertisements,86 and solicitation for remunerative legal 
 
82 Id. at 1066 (quoting In re Rouss, 115 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917)). 
83 See id. at 1070-76 (internal punctuation and citations omitted) (emphasizing 
importance of “preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding,” and noting that, 
“although litigants do not surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse 
door, those interests may be subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting”). 
84 Id. at 1039-43. 
85 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (holding that 
restriction on targeted mail advertisements withstood scrutiny); Shapero v. Ky. Bar 
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479-80 (1988) (striking down restriction on targeted mailings); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655-56 (1985) (reversing 
discipline against attorney for truthful and not misleading statements in advertising, 
but upholding discipline for failure to include sufficient information about costs); 
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (reversing advertising sanction 
against attorney). 
86 See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474-75 (suggesting mode of communication is 
critical factor). 
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services as opposed to pro bono activity.87 Yet the Court has 
consistently protected solicitation for litigation that the Court 
recognized as “political.” In those cases, the Court interpreted the 
communications of lawyers and their agents in the course of 
solicitation as entitled to the highest First Amendment protection. 
 
A. Doctrine on Litigation as Political Expression 
The Supreme Court has taken steps towards recognizing speech in 
support of litigation as a form of expression entitled to First 
Amendment protection, but the grounding and contours of it remain 
ambiguous. The Court’s first move in this direction was NAACP v. 
Alabama,88 in which it ruled that a state court order requiring the 
NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of all of its members and 
agents89 unconstitutionally infringed the NAACP’s “freedom to engage 
in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.”90 The Court 
held that mandated disclosure of identifying information would chill 
members’ exercise of their liberty interest in freedom of association. 
The opinion highlighted the close nexus between the freedoms of 
association, assembly, and speech, and emphasized the free speech 
implications of the state court’s order. Introducing the concept of a 
“right to advocate,”91 the Court stated that association is often 
necessary to realize “effective advocacy,” especially of dissident 
viewpoints.92 
Five years later, the Court focused on the role of litigation as a form 
of expression, especially on behalf of minorities.93 The Virginia 
legislature had expanded that state’s definition of solicitation so that 
 
87 Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (protecting solicitation as 
political speech), with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) 
(ruling speech was unprotected). 
88 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 452 (1958). 
89 Lawyers and litigation were not central to the Patterson decision, though they 
were included among the agents and activities at issue. The Attorney General of 
Alabama had brought an equity suit against the NAACP, alleging that the organization 
had opened a local office, recruited members, solicited donations, provided legal and 
financial assistance to “Negro” students, and supported a bus boycott in Montgomery, 
all while failing to comply with the qualification procedures required before any 
foreign entity may conduct business in the State. Id. at 452. It was in the course of this 
equity suit that the government sought access to the names and addresses of the 
NAACP members and agents. Id. at 453. 
90   Id. at 460. 
91   Id. at 461. 
92   Id. at 460. 
93 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963). 
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the NAACP’s method of outreach to potential clients now constituted 
unlawful activity; the NAACP sought to enjoin the enforcement of the 
new law.94 In NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
NAACP’s “litigation [wa]s not a technique of resolving private 
differences” but a “means for achieving equality of treatment by all 
government . . . for members of the Negro community in this 
country.”95 The Court held that the litigation was entitled to 
constitutional protection as a form of “political expression” on which 
the new Virginia law infringed.96 
The majority of the opinion was devoted to emphasizing the 
importance of litigation not only as a means of vindicating the rights 
of African-Americans, but also as a process for amplifying the voices of 
minority, dissident members of society. According to the Court, it was 
even “more important” than the vindication of individual rights that 
litigation “makes possible the distinctive contribution of a minority 
group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.”97 This language reflects a 
view of litigation as a vehicle for the dissemination of political 
expression, prioritizing the circulation of a diversity of perspectives. 
Notably, the Court was particularly troubled by the quieting of the 
litigation because it suspected that alternative channels of 
communication were inadequate. Arguably, the NAACP had other 
means of communicating its political views, but the Court insisted 
that, for “minority, dissident groups . . . association for litigation may 
be the most effective form of political association”98 and the “sole 
practicable avenue . . . to petition for redress of grievances.”99 This 
language fails to parse distinctions between rights of expression and 
petition,100 but nonetheless embraces a public law conception of 
litigation as an essential means of disseminating a message to 
government actors and to larger society. 
The high water mark of protection for lawyers’ speech in support of 
litigation with a political purpose was In re Primus.101 This case 
identified First Amendment protection for a lawyer separate and apart 
 
94 Id. at 417-18. 
95 Id. at 429. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 431. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 430. 
100 Compare Tsai, supra note 56, at 840-51 (interpreting court access as free speech 
right), with Garcia, supra note 77, at 336 (interpreting court access as a petition right), 
and Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 
728-31 (2003) (same). 
101 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
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from any right held by a client. Edna Smith Primus was an attorney 
practicing in South Carolina who participated in ACLU litigation on a 
pro bono basis.102 Upon invitation, she spoke to a group of low- 
income women who had been sterilized as a condition of continued 
receipt of Medicaid assistance. Primus informed her audience of their 
legal rights and the possibility of initiating litigation.103 She later 
followed up with one of the women, extending a written offer of free 
legal representation by the ACLU. The State of South Carolina 
sanctioned Primus for solicitation.104 
The Supreme Court held that the punishment violated the lawyer’s 
First Amendment rights of political expression and association. 
Explaining that Primus’s solicitation was intended to “advance . . . 
beliefs and ideas”105 on behalf of “unpopular” causes or clients,106 the 
Primus Court extended the notion of protected litigation as described 
in Button to include lawyers who may not themselves be a member of a 
minority but act upon ideological commitment to representing 
unpopular viewpoints or clients.107 Reflecting growing familiarity with 
concepts of “[p]ublic [i]nterest [l]aw”108 and “associational aspect[s] 
of expression,”109 Primus embraced the notion of litigation as a mode 
of political expression and, more specifically, as a particularly valuable 
means of voicing political dissent.110 
 
102 Id. at 414. 
103   Id. at 415-16. 
104   Id. at 417-18. 
105 Id. at 424. 
106 Id. at 427-28. 
107 One aspect of Button that appears to have received scant attention is the Court’s 
mention that all NAACP attorneys at the time were themselves African-American. 
Though it seems doubtful that the Court would have decided the case differently 
otherwise, it implies that perhaps attorneys’ right to litigate is limited to those 
circumstances in which the lawyers’ activities may be viewed as petitioning for redress 
of their own grievances. After Primus, however, it becomes clear that the public 
interest lawyer who cannot claim to experience her clients’ plight as her own still 
enjoys First Amendment protection for her litigation activities. 
108 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 & n.32 (citing Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social 
Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 210-14 (1976)). 
109 Id. (citing Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of 
Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1964) (highlighting role of association in amplifying 
messages to reach broader audiences)). 
110 Leading up to Primus, the Court extended First Amendment protection even to 
litigation that the Court did not explicitly recognize as political, on the theory that 
litigation by union members was protected as part of their right of association. United 
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971); United 
Mineworkers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 225 (1967); Bhd. of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the 
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B. The Expressive Role of the Lawyer 
In 2001, Justice Kennedy authored Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 
an unusual decision elaborating on the unique role of litigation as a 
means of expression and describing lawyers as actors who make 
effective expression possible.111 Unlike the cases before it, Velazquez 
did not discuss the unique contributions of expression on behalf of 
minorities. In fact, though there was a brief reference to the role of 
litigation in social change,112 the decision neither cited the litigation- 
as-political-expression precedent nor explicitly identified the speech in 
Velazquez as political. 
The case addressed whether certain congressional conditions 
imposed on the use of Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) funds, 
appropriated by Congress, violated the “rights of LSC grantees and 
their clients.”113 The key condition prohibited LSC-funded lawyers, 
authorized to represent individual welfare claimants, from raising 
arguments challenging then-existing welfare laws.114 Although the 
Court invalidated the regulation on First Amendment grounds,115 
much of the Court’s reasoning was based on the role of lawyers in 
protecting the balance of powers. Explaining that the judiciary relies 
on advocates to “present all the reasonable and well-grounded 
arguments necessary for proper resolution of [a] case,”116 the Court 
ruled that “[r]estricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in 
presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal 
system by altering the traditional role of the attorneys.”117 
Velazquez endorses the notion of expressive interests particular to 
 
Court reasoned that the right to litigate was essential to preserving those rights 
guaranteed by the federal statutes on which the litigation was based. 377 U.S. at 5-6. 
In United Mineworkers, which concerned workers’ compensation claims, the Court 
expressly denied that Button was limited to political litigation. 389 U.S. at 223. Yet it 
was in Primus, where the litigation was political, that the Court ruled that the 
government conduct at issue was subject to “the ‘exacting scrutiny applicable to 
limitations on core First Amendment rights.’ ” 436 U.S. at 432 (citing Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976)). This stands in direct contrast to the Court’s ruling in 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978), where attorney solicitation 
without a political purpose received a much lower level of protection. Primus and 
Ohralik were issued the same day, and the juxtaposition suggests that the Court 
recognizes the need for higher protection where the litigation is political. 
111 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
112   Id. at 548. 
113   Id. at 536. 
114 Id. at 536-37. 
115 Id. 
116   Id. at 545. 
117   Id. at 544. 
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lawyers’ communications in support of litigation. In contrast, Alabama 
did not highlight lawyers in particular. Both Button and Primus held 
simply that the regulation of lawyers’ speech, even if tied to the 
regulation of the profession, was subject to constitutional review like 
any other government regulation of expression. The Velazquez Court 
goes further and rests its holding on the significance of the lawyer’s 
role in a participatory democracy. While the Velazquez Court never 
fully embraced the label of viewpoint discrimination, which the 
Second Circuit had ascribed to the LSC restrictions,118 the Court found 
that the regulations, designed to shield government views from the 
test of constitutional litigation, impeded a diverse and vibrant dialogue 
meant to occur in court. “[T]he ordinary course of litigation involves 
the expression of theories and postulates on both, or multiple, sides of 
an issue,” the Court explained. This choice of language emphasizes a 
view of the adversary system as one that functions to aid a deliberative 
democracy. Justice Kennedy never describes the protected expression 
as political, and he makes no mention of cases like Alabama, Button, 
and Primus. He does, however, recognize the political implications of 
limiting lawyers’ advocacy, stating, “It is fundamental that the First 
Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”119 
Remarkably,  the  Velazquez  Court  found  that  “no  alternative 
channel” existed for the expression of the message barred by the LSC 
regulations.120 This is telling, given that the restriction at issue affected 
only litigation, not other forms of advocacy or speech.121 Even with 
respect to litigation, the limit applied only to the expression of a 
subset of attorneys. The clients were free to communicate to the 
judiciary any messages they wished, as long as they did so pro se or 
through non-LSC counsel.122 The Court mentioned the unlikelihood 
of indigent clients locating alternative counsel, but both the language 
 
118 Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 769-70 (2d Cir. 1999). 
119 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548 (internal punctuation and quotation omitted). 
120 Id. at 546-47. 
121 The Court does not even mention the possibility of nonlitigation forms of 
expression or means of redress like petitioning the legislature directly. I do not mean 
to overstate the importance of this omission, given that the issue was not before the 
Court, and the LSC lawyers are expressly prohibited from lobbying for welfare reform, 
but perhaps it implies that, on some level, the Court appreciates that litigation is, if 
not the most effective means of political expression for the most vulnerable members 
of society as Button highlighted years before, still an essential one. See NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963). 
122 See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546-47. 
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and the logic of the decision suggest a primary concern with the 
unlikelihood of the prohibited message finding expression in an 
alternative speaker. 
Velazquez does not appear to be based on the First Amendment 
rights of legal services clients. Unlike criminal defendants, welfare 
recipients have not been recognized as possessing a right to a 
lawyer.123 Perhaps the case could have been decided on the welfare 
recipients’ due process rights, but the Court made no such mention. 
Denial of counsel to a civil litigant has generally not been considered 
equivalent to a denial of court access.124 
The decision is best interpreted as resting on the role of lawyers 
expressing messages to courts.125 Comparing the outcome of Velazquez 
to that of Rust v. Sullivan,126 decided a decade earlier, adds further 
support to this interpretation. In Rust, the Court ruled that a 
restriction prohibiting doctors at federally funded clinics from 
discussing abortion with patients was constitutionally valid, despite 
the fact that, as Justice Scalia points out in his Velazquez dissent, the 
clinic patients were “effectively precluded by indigency and poverty 
from seeing a health-care provider who will provide abortion-related 
services.”127 In Rust, the Court explained, “The financial constraints 
that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of 
constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of 
governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her 
indigency.”128 That the Court interprets the restrictions in Velazquez 
so differently suggests it is focused on the role of attorneys, whose 
expression the Court views as vital to a functioning democracy. 
The Court distinguishes Rust on grounds that imply lawyers’ 
expressive rights may be more robust than those of other 
 
123 Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (establishing 
right to appointed counsel for criminal defendants), with Velazquez, 531 U.S at 557 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting that neither party alleged welfare claimants 
enjoyed right to appointed counsel). 
124 The closest the Court ever came to recognizing a right to a lawyer as an aspect 
of the right to court access may have been Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), 
in which the Court ruled that, to avoid obstructing the right to petition for habeas 
corpus, a prison was constitutionally obligated to provide either law libraries or 
assistance from persons trained in the law. 
125 See also Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281-82 
(1985) (ruling that opportunity to practice law is fundamental right for purposes of 
Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
126 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191-201 (1991). 
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professionals. Without overtly embracing the notion of lawyers as 
higher in the constitutional order than other professionals, the Court 
rules that, while government-funded doctors function as speakers for 
the government and can be expected to disseminate the government’s 
message, government-funded lawyers, in contrast, are charged with 
expressing a “diversity” of perspectives.129 This logic suggests that 
there exists some “nomos”130 of a lawyer that goes beyond positive law 
and is essentially connected to the advocacy of diverse messages. The 
Court highlights that in a welfare case, the government has its own 
lawyer to deliver its message, while the LSC attorney serves a different 
master. The LSC attorney cannot present the government’s views, 
because she functions to present those of her own client.131 The Court 
places special emphasis on how Congressional attempts to impose 
messages on the LSC lawyers distorts their fundamental role as neutral 
partisans. 
To the extent that Velazquez implies that lawyers’ expressive rights 
are more important in a deliberative democracy than the expressive 
rights of others, the Court’s true motivation appears to be that 
infringements on lawyers’ activities not only interfere with the 
exchange of ideas generally, but also threaten to disrupt the balance of 
powers. Drawing on the language of Marbury v. Madison concerning 
the “mission of the judiciary,”132 the opinion states repeatedly that 
truncating the lawyers’ analysis and presentation of issues deprives the 
judiciary of the “informed, independent bar” upon whose “speech and 
expression” “courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial 
power.”133 By undercutting the lawyers, the Court says, Congress 
undercuts the judicial branch. Interpreting the LSC intrusions on 
lawyers’ work as depriving the courts of their constitutionally 
 
129 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542. Justice Scalia accuses the majority of demonstrating 
“improper special solicitude for our own profession.” Id. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see Barton, supra note 28, at 455 n.4. For a snapshot of the Court’s views on 
journalists’ protection, see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) 
(noting skepticism about chilling effects and risks to journalist’s sources as result of 
search of newsroom); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) (“[W]e remain 
unclear how often and to what extent informers are actually deterred from furnishing 
information when newsmen are forced to testify . . . .”); see also Blasi, Checking Value, 
supra note 61, at 591-611. 
130 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5-11 (1983). 
131 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542 (“The lawyer is not the government’s speaker. The 
attorney defending the decision to deny benefits will deliver the government’s message 
in the litigation. The LSC lawyer, however, speaks on the behalf of his or her private, 
indigent client.”). 
132 Id. at 545 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
133 Id. at 545 (citation omitted). 
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mandated authority, Velazquez aligns the healthy functioning of the 
advocate with proper checks on governmental authority.134 
While the cases discussed above suggest that lawyers’ 
communications in the course of litigation deserve First Amendment 
protection, they leave certain questions unanswered. Although a First 
Amendment decision, Velazquez did not overtly recognize the political 
expression elements of the litigation at issue. Justice Kennedy did not 
set his opinion against the background of Button and Primus. For their 
part, the earlier cases involving the NAACP and ACLU, while more 
explicitly grounded in a right to advocate, existed in a particular 
historical context, roughly half a century ago, in which the Court may 
have believed that the governmental interest on the other side was 
little more than a fig leaf for intentionally thwarting the activities of 
civil rights groups. Those rulings, therefore, may not provide the best 
indicator of how the Court would rule if faced with a real 
governmental interest. In the next part, I consider a present-day 
example in which the government’s interest is quite real. 
 
IV. CASE STUDY IN GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN LITIGATION 
To further the inquiry concerning the level of protection that ought 
to be accorded attorneys’ communications in support of litigation, this 
part examines a case study of attorneys representing Guantánamo 
detainees under the shadow of warrantless wiretapping. The example 
of the Guantánamo lawyers’ advocacy and the government 
interference with it illustrates the First Amendment values promoted 
by litigation and threatened by government intrusions. I begin by 
providing some background on the surveillance and the ways in which 
the surveillance impeded the lawyers’ fact-gathering and formulating 
of theories. I then turn to the First Amendment values at stake. 
Finally, I utilize the case study to highlight challenges for formulating 
a theory of litigation as expression. 
 
A. Surveillance of Lawyers 
On December 17, 2005, President George W. Bush announced that, 
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, he had authorized the 
National Security Agency (“NSA”) to engage in a warrantless 
surveillance program “to intercept the international communications 
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organizations.”135 The once-secret program became commonly known 
as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (“TSP”). As of 2005, President 
Bush had reauthorized the program more than thirty times.136 
The TSP authorized the NSA to gather foreign intelligence by 
monitoring communications whenever one party was outside the 
United States and the government had “reason to believe that at least 
one party to the communication” had a “link” to or was “affiliated” or 
“associated” with al Qaeda or “related terrorist organizations,”137 was a 
member of an organization that the government considered “affiliated” 
with al Qaeda,138 or worked “in support of al Qaeda.”139 The 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) confirmed the details of the 
surveillance program in a forty-two page White Paper, issued on 
January 19, 2006.140 In January 2007, Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales announced the suspension of the TSP,141 but President Bush 
expressly reserved the right to reinstitute it at any time.142 Since taking 
office, President Obama has not stated otherwise; instead, his 
administration has refused to take a position on the constitutionality 
 
 
135 Bush Radio Address, supra note 10. 
136 President George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President (Dec. 19, 2005) 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/19/politics/19text-bush.html. 
137 See Bush Radio Address, supra note 10; Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, ASK 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 25, 2006), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ask/ 
20060125.html. 
138 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales and General Michael V. Hayden (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter 
Gonzales/Hayden Press Briefing] available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ 
library/news/2005/intell-051219-dni01.htm. 
139 Id.; General Michael V. Hayden, Address to the National Press Club: What 
American Intelligence and Especially the NSA Have Been Doing To Defend the Nation 
(Jan. 23, 2006) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.html; 
see also Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency 
Described by the President, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 19, 2006), available at 
http://fas.org/irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf [hereinafter DOJ White Paper]. 
140 DOJ White Paper, supra note 139. 
141 See Letter from Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales to Senate Comm. on Judiciary 
(Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/general/asset_upload_ 
file372_28043.pdf. 
142 ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 712 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting) 
(describing government’s position at oral argument); Modernization of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th 
Cong. 52-53 (2007) (testimony of Michael McConnell, Director of National 
Intelligence); Declaration of Joseph J. Brand, Assoc. Dir. of Cmty. Integration, Policy 
& Records for the NSA, 2 n.1, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 07 Civ. 3833(DLC), 
2008 WL 2567765 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); James Risen, Administration Pulls Back on 
Surveillance Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007, at A18. 
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of the TSP and has insisted that no court should rule on it.143 
The definition of those targeted under the TSP can be interpreted to 
include an attorney representing an individual or organization 
suspected of terrorist activity. The Department of Defense has 
described all detainees in Guantánamo Bay as “terrorists” or “enemy 
combatants.”144 Those engaged in representation are necessarily 
“associated with” and working “in support of” their clients.145 Lawyers 
representing Guantánamo detainees appear to fall within the 
Program’s scope. 
Targeting Guantánamo lawyers for surveillance would match other 
claims by executive officials that the detainees are not entitled to 
unfettered access to counsel.146 The possibility of surveillance of 
Guantánamo attorneys heightened after the Bush administration began 
to claim that the Guantánamo detainees and their counsel were not 
entitled to the protections of the attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine. During the Bush and Obama administrations, the 
federal government has argued to courts that it is entitled to monitor 
communications between Guantánamo detainees and their lawyers.147 
 
143 Transcript of Proceedings at 5-7, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-4726) (transcript on file with author); Kearney, supra note 12 
(reporting on comments at oral argument). 
144 All Guantánamo detainees have been determined by the Department of Defense 
to be “enemy combatants.” See Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, Implementation of 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., July 29, 2004, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf; Sgt. Doug Sample, 
Rumsfeld Says Media Show Only ‘Negative’ Side of Iraq War, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., 
June 28, 2005, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16281 
(citation omitted). 
145 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-14 (2010) 
(reviewing statute under which legal advice or assistance constitutes providing 
“material support”); Alissa Clare, We Should Have Gone to Med School: In the Wake of 
Lynne Stewart, Lawyers Face Hard Time for Defending Terrorists, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 651, 667-68 (2005) (arguing government must clarify how material support 
statutes will be used with respect to lawyers or no counsel will be able to represent 
those accused of terrorist activity without risking criminal prosecution). 
146 See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1981, 1988-92 (2003) [hereinafter Guantánamo]. 
147 See, e.g., Hicks v. Bush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 88, 99-101 (D.D.C. 2006) (ruling on 
government’s motion for order allowing interception of attorney-client 
communications); In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 186-91 
(D.D.C. 2004) (ruling on government’s motion restricting counsel’s access to and use 
of client information); Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-10 (D.D.C. 
2004) (ruling that government could not engage in real-time monitoring of attorney- 
client communications or review attorney notes and mail between attorneys and 
clients). 
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This assertion solidified many attorneys’ suspicions that the 
government had few qualms about intercepting their 
communications.148 
Government officials never stated publicly that Guantánamo 
attorneys’ phones were tapped, but, in 2006, Assistant Attorney 
General William E. Moschella confirmed that lawyers acting in their 
professional capacities were not excluded from TSP surveillance.149 
The New York Times reported that two senior DOJ officials admitted 
“they knew of . . . a handful of terrorism cases . . . in which the 
government might have monitored lawyer-client conversations.”150 In 
a few cases, government representatives admitted that attorneys’ 
communications with clients were monitored. In one situation, the 
U.S. Treasury Department inadvertently delivered to an attorney a 
logbook, marked “top secret,” which reflected NSA monitoring of her 
calls with her client, a Saudi charity.151 In another situation, federal 
agents notified Thomas B. Wilner, a partner at Shearman & Sterling 
LLP who represents a number of Guantánamo detainees, that he was 
probably subject to surveillance.152 
The widespread acknowledgements that detainees’ attorneys are 
possible targets of surveillance caused “many prominent criminal 
defense lawyers [to] say [there] is a well-founded fear that all of their 
contacts are being monitored by the United States government.”153 A 
group of twenty-three Guantánamo attorneys filed a lawsuit under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),154 seeking records from the NSA 
and DOJ indicating whether or not the attorneys have been targeted.155 
 
148 Philip Shenon, Lawyers Fear Monitoring in Cases on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
28, 2008, at A1. 
149 Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella, Responses to Joint Questions 
from House Judiciary Committee Minority Members, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ¶ 4 (Mar. 24, 
2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj032406.pdf. 
150 Shenon, supra note 148, at A1. 
151 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 
2007); Patrick Radden Keefe, Annals of Surveillance: State Secrets, NEW YORKER, Apr. 
28, 2008, at 28. 
152 Declaration of Thomas B. Wilner ¶ 5, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 07 Civ. 
3833(DLC), 2008 WL 2567765 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) [hereinafter Wilner Decl.]. While the 
veracity of the officials’ comments is hard to test, the effect is the same either way: 
based on a threat of surveillance by a representative of the U.S. government, Mr. 
Wilner’s speech has been chilled. 
153 Shenon, supra note 148, at A1. 
154   5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2009). 
155 Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 387 (2010); William Glaberson, Lawyers for Guantánamo Inmates Accuse U.S. of 
Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at A18. 
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The Obama administration, like the Bush administration, has refused 
to confirm or deny the surveillance.156 
The case study contained in this Article draws on anecdotal 
evidence from these twenty-three lawyers, all of whom represent 
individuals currently or formerly detained in Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba,157 or “next friends”158 engaged in litigation on behalf of detained 
family members.159 The attorneys’ statements presented in this Article 
are based on declarations publicly filed in the attorneys’ FOIA suit. 
This set of lawyers is a mixed sample of staff attorneys at nonprofit, 
human rights, and civil rights organizations, partners and associates at 
private law firms, and law professors. Through counsel, the clients 
have initiated civil actions in federal courts based on constitutional, 
statutory, and international human rights claims. These include 
petitions for habeas corpus, challenges to conditions of confinement, 
and civil rights actions for abuse and torture.160 A number of the 
litigants also challenge the legality of their prior imprisonment in 
secret detention facilities operated by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(“CIA”).161 
While many of the cases involve novel challenges to U.S. law, 
policy, or practice, others turn on evidence more than on legal 
arguments. For example, many of the detainees claim that they are not 
 
156 See Wilner, 592 F.3d at 64 (NSA and DOJ under Obama asserted Glomar 
response and expressly taking position that it could neither confirm or deny 
surveillance). 
157 Some of these lawyers also represent clients detained in Afghanistan or 
elsewhere, but I will occasionally refer to the group of lawyers as the Guantánamo 
lawyers for purposes of simplicity. 
158 Though neither a guardian nor a party, a “next friend” may appear in a lawsuit 
on behalf a plaintiff unable to do so for himself. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (3rd 
Pocket ed. 2006). 
159 Wilner v. National Security Agency, No. 07 Civ. 3833(DLC), 2008 WL 2567765 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). The clients of the lawyers in this sample include most of the men 
whom government officials have named individually as among the most dangerous 
people in the world, exactly the sort of people for whom the TSP was created. See 
sources cited, supra note 144. 
160 See, e.g., Complaint, Celikgogus v. Rumsfeld (D.D.C. 2007) (06-cv-1996(HHK)), 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CELIKGOGUS_AmendComplaint.pdf (seeking 
declaratory relief and damages for prior detention and torture of multiple plaintiffs, in 
violation of U.S. and international laws); Petition, Khan v. Bush, (D.D.C. 2006) (06-cv- 
01690(RBW)), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/2006.09.28%20-Habeas%20Petition 
%20-%20Majid%20Khan_Stamped.pdf. (seeking writ of habeas corpus for individual 
detainee). 
161 See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶¶ 38-61, Khan v. Gates (D.D.C. 2006) 
(06-cv-01690 (RBW)), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/2006.09.28%20-Habeas% 
20Petition%20-%20Majid%20Khan_Stamped.pdf. 
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wartime combatants captured from battlefields but ordinary civilians, 
trapped after bounty hunters kidnapped them from their homes.162 
These clients need their lawyers to establish the veracity of their 
stories. Other individuals maintain that they have experienced years of 
physical, sexual, and psychological abuse at the hands of U.S. 
officials.163 Some of these claims involve sophisticated interpretations 
of precedent, but others depend primarily on access to and the 
presentation of proof. 
 
B. Effects on Lawyers’ Communications 
The threat of surveillance has prevented Guantánamo attorneys 
from guaranteeing the confidentiality of their electronic 
communications.164 The stories that follow demonstrate the extent to 
which the threat of surveillance has hampered their ability to gather 
evidence, formulate theories, and present facts and arguments to the 
courts. 
First and foremost, the government’s threat of electronic 
surveillance has significantly impaired the lawyers’ fact-gathering. 
Given the risk of electronic eavesdropping, the lawyers have been 
limited in their ability to initiate or participate in telephone, e-mail, 
and facsimile communications.165 The mandates of zealous advocacy 
dictate that the attorney overturn every stone for information 
potentially relevant to her client’s claims,166 but, as a matter of both 
ethics and strategy, she cannot risk revealing confidential information 
to a third party. This is particularly true where, as here, the 
eavesdropper is not simply a third party whose presence could disturb 
the confidentiality of the communications, but the client’s sole 
 
 
162 See, e.g., Declaration of Gitanjali S. Gutierrez ¶ 24 (referencing the kidnapping 
and detention of one of the Declarant’s clients) [hereinafter Gutierrez Decl.]. 
163 See, e.g., Complaint, Celikgogus v. Rumsfeld (D.D.C. 2007) (06-cv-1996(HHK)), 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CELIKGOGUS_AmendComplaint.pdf; Petition, 
Khan v. Bush, (D.D.C. 2006) (06-cv-01690(RBW)), available at http://ccrjustice.org/ 
files/2006.09.28%20-Habeas%20Petition%20-%20Majid%20Khan_Stamped.pdf. (seeking 
writ of habeas corpus for individual detainee). 
164 E.g., Declaration of John A. Chandler ¶ 5, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765 
[hereinafter Chandler Decl.]; Declaration of J. Wells Dixon ¶ 20, Wilner, 2008 WL 
2567765 [hereinafter Dixon Decl.]; Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶¶ 24-25; Wilner 
Decl., supra note 152, ¶ 8. 
165 E.g., Chandler Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 5; Declaration of Tina Monshipour 
Foster ¶ 20, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765 [hereinafter Foster Decl.]. 
166 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002). 
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adversary.167 Attorney John Chandler explains, “The defendants in my 
cases are the President of the United States, the Secretary [sic] of the 
Department of Defense and the commander of the base at 
Guantánamo. I fear that the NSA might communicate the information 
obtained to the lawyers for the respondents in my case[s].”168 
The lawyers and witnesses are especially wary of government 
seizure of confidential information in the Guantánamo cases, where 
the potential dangers include the use of intercepted information not 
simply in a formal proceeding but also in less visible, less regulated 
arenas. Many of these detainees have experienced physical and 
emotional abuse while in U.S. custody.169 Guards have routinely 
punished detainees who sought access to counsel. Attorney Gitanjali 
S. Gutierrez explains, “Detainees have been held in solitary 
confinement for up to 11 days prior to a legal visit . . . ; one detainee 
reported that he was told the stay in isolation was ‘the lawyer’s fault’ 
and could have been avoided had no legal visit been scheduled.”170 
Even if the attorneys had reason to trust that the NSA would not 
reveal their clients’ confidences, either to government counsel 
prosecuting the cases or to guards holding the detainees in physical 
custody, witnesses have been unconvinced. The threat to 
confidentiality has thereby distorted the flow of information by 
impairing, or in some cases fully preventing, the formation of trusting 
relationships.171 After learning of the possibility of surveillance, 
numerous witnesses, who might otherwise have provided relevant 
factual information, ceased communications with counsel or refused 
to discuss any substantive topics.172 Even putting aside the subjective 
chill on speech created by the attorneys’ own concerns about 
wiretapping, the globally publicized possibility of surveillance has 
curtailed fact-gathering by silencing sources. 
 
167 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6; see Charlie Cassidy & Cassandra 
Porsch, Government Monitoring of Attorney-Client Communications in Terrorism-Related 
Cases: Ethical Implications for Defense Attorneys, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 681, 692-94 
(2004) (considering attorneys’ obligation to challenge or refuse to cooperate with 
government monitoring). 
168 Chandler Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 11. 
169 See, e.g., Declaration of George Brent Mikum IV ¶ 17, Wilner, 2008 WL 
2567765 [hereinafter Mikum Decl.] (describing controlled drowning of his client, 
Zayn al-abidin Muhammad Husayn). 
170 Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶ 35. 
171 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 43, at 127-28. 
172 E.g., Chandler Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 5; Foster Decl., supra note 165, ¶ 20; 
Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶ 24; Declaration of Brian J. Neff ¶ 26, Wilner 2008 
WL 2567765. It is worth noting that fear may constrict lawyers’ and witnesses’ 
thinking even more narrowly than they consciously intend. 
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The looming threat of surveillance has changed the attorneys’ 
communications both quantitatively and qualitatively — not only 
blocking the flow of information, but also distorting what gets 
through. Because electronic communications have become risky or 
impossible, Guantánamo lawyers have searched for alternative avenues 
of communication and many have resorted to in-person meetings or 
mail couriers to communicate around the globe.173 These mediums of 
communication have slightly expanded the set of information available 
to the attorneys but have added significant burdens to the 
representation of Guantánamo detainees. 
Foreign travel has been expensive, time-consuming, and, in some 
instances, wholly impracticable. Many individuals with information 
relevant to the detainees’ cases live in Middle Eastern countries to 
which flights from the United States are a luxury that neither lawyers 
at nonprofit organizations, nor even well-heeled law firm partners, can 
always afford.174 Some trips were made, but not with the frequency 
necessary to keep clients informed and prepare cases in the manner 
the attorneys considered appropriate. In some situations, foreign travel 
would have risked the attorneys’ safety, because of the conditions in 
the countries where witnesses or clients resided.175 In others, in- 
person communications were legally foreclosed. Saudi Arabia, for 
example, denied the visa applications of the Center for Constitutional 
Rights (“CCR”), making it effectively impossible for the attorneys 
from this organization to gather evidence from their Saudi clients’ 
families.176 
Attorneys in some instances resorted to postal communications to 
supplement foreign travel. Operating without real-time 
communications not only slowed the flow of information but also 
seems to have impaired the attorneys’ understanding of the 
information conveyed. Without clarifying or follow-up questions, 
these limited communications may leave the advocate operating with 
an incomplete or inaccurate set of facts.177 Miscommunications, all the 
more likely across boundaries of language and culture, may be 
overlooked and unresolved in the absence of back-and-forth 
 
173 E.g., Dixon Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 20; Declaration of Candace Gorman ¶ 18, 
Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765 [hereinafter Gorman Decl.]; Gutierrez Decl., supra note 
162, ¶¶ 24-25. 
174 Id. 
175 E.g., Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶¶ 25, 27, 36; Declaration of Joseph 
Margulies ¶ 9, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765. 
176 Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶¶ 24, 27. 
177 Id. ¶ 25. 
 
 









communications, the impediments to real-time, multi-party 
communications like telephone conferences have restricted the 
Guantánamo attorneys’ opportunities for collaborative dialogue with 
co-counsel and experts.179 Such limits on the free formulation and 
exploration of ideas may stunt the development of factual and legal 
theories.180 One might argue that brainstorming about strategy with 
colleagues is particularly vital for lawyers facing unprecedented legal 
hurdles to their clients’ constitutional rights. 
 
C. Effects on Court-Directed Advocacy 
As described in the previous section, the threat of wiretapping has 
impeded the factual and legal development in the Guantánamo cases, 
but the next consideration is whether and to what extent that 
impediment truly has First Amendment implications. This section 
questions the extent to which the curtailment of communications 
affected the ability of the lawyers to protect their clients’ individual 
rights, disseminate ideas into the public marketplace, or restrict abuses 
of government power. 
Unfortunately, the degree and significance of the restriction is 
difficult to assess. Measuring the full implications of the chilled 
communications would require a hypothetical assessment of what 
might have existed under circumstances that did not transpire. To 
measure the communication that was stifled before reaching the 
judiciary, one would need to assess the facts and witnesses never 
discovered, the creative theories never developed, and the cases never 
accepted. 
One area that permits measurement is the passage of time. In a case 
in which attorney Gitanjali S. Gutierrez represented an individual 
challenging his enemy combatant status, communications with 
witnesses were impeded for roughly twelve months.181 The detainee 
had filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention as an 
enemy combatant. He alleged that he was not captured in combat on 
 
178 See Susan Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, The Five Habits of Cross Cultural 
Lawyering, reprinted in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 57-59 (Kimberly Holt 
Barrett & William H. George eds., 2004). 
179 Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶ 23. 
180 As the Supreme Court has highlighted in its work product doctrine, the threat 
of disclosure can cramp lawyers’ thinking and, therefore, their representation of their 
clients. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). 
181 See Gutierrez Decl., supra note 162, ¶ 24. 
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the battlefield, but rather kidnapped from his home in the middle of 
the night by bounty hunters and, therefore, did not fit the definition of 
an enemy combatant.182 The attorney’s communications with the first- 
hand witness to the kidnapping, the client’s brother, were delayed 
until she was able to fly to Pakistan. Given the constitutional 
significance of any of extension of time of imprisonment,183 such 
interference may be interpreted to have compromised the client’s 
individual rights. 
Beyond any harm to the individual detainees’ cases, the open 
possibility that the government has been monitoring the lawyers’ 
communications has threatened the attorneys’ unrelated practices.184 
In large private firms, phone and fax lines may be monitored, thereby 
jeopardizing the firm’s practice based on the choices of a few 
associates and partners to represent Guantánamo detainees. Some of 
these firms represent international clients with commercial cases 
pending against the government.185 The case study did not include any 
evidence of clients seeking other counsel due to the threat of 
government surveillance, but this might have occurred without any 
record of it. One attorney explained that because of the wholesale 
threat of surveillance, she “stopped taking on new cases.”186 In these 
ways, the chilling effects of the threat of surveillance have caused 
some lawyers to risk loss of employment or to no longer accept 
representation of Guantánamo detainees. 
Government threats to the Guantánamo attorneys’ law practices 
have the potential to constrict the supply of lawyers able and willing 
to represent the detainees. It is worth noting that the Guantánamo 
litigation does continue today; it is not the case that all such 
representation has dried up. Nonetheless, because of the role of the 
Guantánamo litigation in criticizing U.S. policies and practices, and 
checking potential abuses of power by legislative and executive actors, 
such constrictions on the flow of messages to the judiciary deserve 
special attention. 
 
V. LESSONS OF GUANTÁNAMO FOR A THEORY OF LITIGATION AS 
EXPRESSION 
Drawing on the case study of Guantánamo lawyers allows us to 
 
182 See id. (indicating detainee was kidnapped prior to detention). 
183 See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001). 
184 Wilner Decl., supra note 152, ¶ 7. 
185 See id. ¶ 8. 
186 Gorman Decl., supra note 173, ¶ 18. 
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return to the earlier Supreme Court cases with renewed appreciation 
of the First Amendment significance of lawyers’ communications in 
support of litigation.187 The scenario described above appears, in many 
ways, to be a perfect candidate for recognition of litigation as political 
expression. At the same time, the case study highlights the challenges 
of recognizing any lawyer’s communications in support of litigation as 
political expression. 
 
A. Defining “Political” Litigation 
The Supreme Court has historically distinguished attorney 
communications that are political expression, entitled to the highest 
First Amendment protection,188 from those that are only commercial 
speech, entitled to intermediate scrutiny.189 Distinguishing litigation as 
a form of political expression from “ordinary”190 litigation may be a 
difficult exercise in line-drawing. 
Five key factors emerge from Supreme Court jurisprudence as 
determinative of whether litigation should be protected as political 
expression: (1) whether the litigation is motivated by “political 
aims”;191 (2) whether the client or potential client is a 
“disenfranchised” “minority”; (3) whether the litigation advocates an 
“unpopular,”192 “controversial,”193 or “dissident”194 viewpoint; (4) 
whether the legal services are provided free of charge; and (5) whether 
the government is an adversary. I do not mean to suggest that all five 
factors are necessary for advocacy to be protected as political 
 
187 The descriptions provided are based on the experiences of a relatively small 
group of attorneys, and of course their own perceptions and motivations might 
influence the dynamics they observe and report. Like any qualitative analysis based on 
a small sample, this analysis serves not to prove with certainty any maxim about the 
laws of human nature, but rather to shed light on the mechanisms of a particular 
problem, this one created by governmental intrusions into attorneys’ communications. 
188 Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (protecting solicitation as 
political speech) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1978) 
(applying lower level of review for solicitation not alleged to be political speech). 
189 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634-35 (1995) (interpreting 
attorney advertisements as “pure commercial speech”). See generally Cent. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563-65 (1980) 
(identifying intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech). 
190 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420 (1963). 
191 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427; see Button, 371 U.S. at 429; NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). 
192 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28. 
193 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. 
194 Button, 371 U.S. at 431. 
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expression, but rather each is a consideration that appears to add 
weight in favor of such a determination. Drawing on the Guantánamo 
example, I will briefly explore each of these factors to clarify their 
meaning, purpose, and utility for developing a theory of litigation as 
political expression. 
 
1. Political Motivation 
Litigation that is motivated by political aims has been recognized by 
the Court as political.195 While this seems intuitively correct, 
numerous definitional questions emerge. These questions are far more 
substantive than semantic. 
As an initial matter, one must ask whose motivation is to be 
assessed. In the NAACP cases, the Court focused on the aims of the 
organization and had no occasion to distinguish those of the 
individual members or their representative.196 In Primus, this 
distinction became more significant because, while Edna Primus and 
the ACLU had political motivations for their solicitation efforts, those 
efforts were unsuccessful, and the potential client was distinctly 
uninterested in the lawyers’ agenda. In Primus, the Court was focused 
on the ACLU’s motivations and those of Ms. Primus.197 
The notion of public interest lawyers with social justice goals of 
their own, separate from the interests of their clients, has always raised 
the potential for conflicts of interest.198 If the lawyer’s litigation 
activities, including speech in support of litigation, serve a public role, 
further consideration must be given to defining the lawyer’s duty to 
the individual client. This may be more of an ethical question than a 
doctrinal one, but it highlights the need for clarity regarding whose 
motivations ultimately define the nature of the litigation. If there is a 
conflict, allowing the lawyer’s perception to trump the client’s seems 
to contradict principles of agency.199 At the same time, under the 
current doctrine, if either a lawyer or a client is motivated by political 
goals, that commitment should be sufficient to find the litigation 
 
195 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427; see Button, 371 U.S. at 429; Patterson, 357 U.S. at 
460-61. 
196 See Button, 371 U.S. at 429-30; Patterson, 436 U.S. at 459-61. 
197 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28. 
198 See Lobel, supra note 77, at 548, 555 (describing movement lawyer’s obligation 
to make strategic decisions based on goals of clients and “the political movement they 
represent,” and recognizing potential conflicts between “movement” and individual 
clients). 
199 Lobel suggests that lawyers must follow their clients’ lead regarding the 
strategic decisions, rather than following their own political “instincts.” Id. 
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politically motivated. 
Even more complicated than identifying the principal actor whose 
motivation governs, however, is the matter of defining “political 
aims.” Must the aim be to make direct social change through a judicial 
decision? The NAACP and Primus decisions concerned litigation that 
explicitly disseminated political messages in the form of legal claims. 
Yet, as Jules Lobel argues, courts provide, in a less explicit but perhaps 
even more significant way, an amplified platform for attracting public 
attention for expression of dissent against government policies.200 
Even when a court cannot or will not directly stay the hand of another 
government actor, litigation may do so indirectly through “persistent 
and persuasive appeals to the public consciousness.”201 Lobel suggests 
that litigation has historically galvanized support for social movements 
by lending credibility to activists’ positions and putting added pressure 
on targeted parties.202 Because these less direct forms of messaging also 
serve the marketplace of ideas and facilitate checks on abuses of 
government power, these forms of litigation should also be considered 
political. 
The Supreme Court has left it unclear whether “political” litigation 
includes only litigation that aims to secure broad-scale changes in the 
law, or if individual cases without significant precedential weight also 
reflect First Amendment values. The Court has historically recognized 
the First Amendment value in constitutional litigation challenging 
government policy but not in individual representation of poor people 
or criminal defendants. In Button, the Court highlighted that the 
NAACP did not handle what the Court labeled “ordinary damages 
actions” nor represent criminal defendants without allegations of race 
discrimination.203 In Velazquez, though the Court struck down the 
restrictions on welfare litigation, it did not explicitly endorse a notion 
of civil legal services as political.204 
 
200 Id. 
201 See Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 550 (asserting that although 
marketplace of ideas does not guarantee that truth prevails, freedom of speech leaves 
open theoretical possibility of rational persuasion). 
202 Lobel, supra note 77, at 479-80; see id. at 486 (disputing assertions that courts 
are not institutions that make effective social change); but see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 33-35, 245-46 (1991). 
203 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420 (1963). 
204 Interestingly, the Legal Services Corporation in Velazquez tried to make exactly 
this distinction — permitting legal services lawyers to represent claimants in 
individual welfare hearings yet banning federal challenges to the governing welfare 
laws — and was found to violate the First Amendment. Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001). 
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As the Guantánamo example helps to show, some individual 
representation is political even if it appears to reflect no explicit claims 
concerning large-scale social policies. The attorneys in the case study 
view their role as both protecting individual rights and challenging 
federal policy in the War on Terrorism.205 As attorney Clive Stafford 
Smith explains, “[I]n the representation of these clients, the main 
work has been to (legitimately) challenge every aspect of the secrecy 
regime possible.”206 Excluding individual representation from the 
definition of political litigation could exclude a case of a detainee 
challenging his individual status as an enemy combatant, given that 
such litigation might be based on the facts of his case — whether or 
not he was not captured from a battlefield — rather than a broad 
critique of U.S. policy. Yet the Guantánamo litigation has been 
undertaken as part of a larger concerted effort that is indisputably 
political. The line between classic public interest lawyering and 
individual representation is hazier than the Supreme Court has 
suggested. Motivations for litigation can change over time as facts 
emerge and theories develop. As Mr. Stafford Smith attests, litigation 
can also be based on dual motives from the beginning. 
The Guantánamo cases illustrate the conceptual difficulties of 
separating litigation to protect individual rights from that aimed at 
larger social change.207 Many “ordinary” public defenders208 and civil 
legal services attorneys209 view their work as inherently political and 
 
205 See, e.g., Declaration of Michael Sternhell ¶ 16, Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 
07 Civ. 3833(DLC), 2008 WL 2567765 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“I consider it an honor and 
privilege to represent innocent men who have been denied due process and the 
opportunity to prove their innocence before a court of law. And I consider it my duty 
as a lawyer to contest my government’s efforts to violate the Constitution . . . in its 
extralegal detention of my clients and other prisoners at Guantánamo . . . .”). 
206 Declaration of Clive A. Stafford Smith, ¶ 22, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765; see also, 
e.g., Dixon Decl., supra note 164, ¶ 29 (“I believe that ensuring basic due process 
rights for anyone detained by the Executive Branch is consistent with traditional 
principles of American justice and the highest standards of our legal system.”); Mikum 
Decl., supra note 169, ¶ 21 (“It is important that I be allowed to represent my client 
. . . who is falsely accused and wrongfully tortured.”). 
207 See Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657, 662-90 (2004) (dividing cause lawyers into proceduralist, 
elite/vanguard, and grassroots). 
208 Smith, supra note 46, at 953 (describing criminal defense activity as 
participation in larger movement for social change). 
209 See, e.g., SOUTH BROOKLYN LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.sbls.org (last visited Apr. 
1, 2011) (“The mission of South Brooklyn Legal Services is to seek equal justice for 
low-income people in Brooklyn by providing a broad range of legal advocacy and 
information, helping empower poor people to identify and defeat the causes and 
effects of poverty in their communities.”). 
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social justice–oriented.210 All of these categories of litigation may be 
political,211 and the distinction between “political” lawyering and 
“ordinary” lawyering may be unworkable.212 
Given this context, courts assessing the accuracy and veracity of a 
party’s claims of “political aims” are in a difficult situation. Trying to 
puzzle through the philosophical meaning of “political” is no answer. 
This is partly because judges are not philosophy experts, but also 
because the doctrinal inquiry has a different purpose: isolating that 
category of activity that society has chosen to protect, perhaps largely 
for instrumentalist reasons. One might suggest the following 
approach: if the lawyer represents that the litigation has political aims, 
her assertion should resolve this prong of the inquiry.213 While this 
may seem overly deferential to the party claiming a First Amendment 
interest, erring in the other direction takes us back into the morass of 
unwise and unworkable inquiries.214 Admittedly, in theory, any 
attorney could make a bald assertion of political motivation, but 
hopefully consideration of other factors, discussed below, will 
decrease the frequency of such occurrences. 
As a final note on distinguishing when litigation is motivated by 
 
210 See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, 
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 94-95 (2004) (identifying cause lawyers 
focused on empowering individual clients). 
211 The deeper meaning of “political litigation” is beyond the scope of this article. 
All litigation is political in that it concerns the ordering of social relations. See id. 
(broadly defining cause lawyering to include widely varying forms “directed at 
altering some aspect of the social, economic, and political status quo”). Just as an 
example, an “ordinary” welfare case or landlord-tenant dispute concerns the 
redistribution of wealth and property. See Tarkington, supra note 69, at 388 & 
nn.157-58. Nonetheless, it may be that certain forms of litigation have a more direct 
connection to political speech than others and, where the connection is too tenuous, 
we may not extend the same protection. 
212 See Stuart A. Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: 
Practice Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 229- 
36 (1998). 
213 With the exception of Velazquez, which was not overtly political, the litigation- 
as-expression cases have highlighted the attorneys’ demonstrated political ideologies, 
pointing to their affiliations and past litigation activities. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 
U.S. 412, 414-15 & n.1-2 (1978) (describing Ms. Primus’ affiliation with ACLU, 
ACLU’s history, and organization’s stated mission); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
419-22 & n.5 (1963) (describing history and structure of NAACP and NAACP LDF). 
A full-blown evidentiary examination of the attorneys’ motivations could become an 
unwieldy sideshow and obstacle to litigation, but an affirmation of one’s political 
intent seems a reasonable requirement. 
214 For a discussion of the unworkability of recognizing any litigation as political 
expression, see Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 
620, 642-43 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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political aims, one difference that may be observed between the 
litigation-as-political-expression precedent and the Guantánamo 
example is that, in the former set of cases, to determine the motivation 
behind the litigation, the Court referenced the past activities of the 
organization with which the attorney was associated,215 but many of 
the Guantánamo attorneys are private counsel associated with no 
political organization.216 It seems a matter of common sense that an 
attorney can engage in litigation for political purposes even if not a 
member of a traditional political organization.217 Further, society is 
best served if courts protect these private lawyers, so that they are able 
to provide pro bono representation to clients who might otherwise be 
unrepresented. The rationale behind recognizing litigation as political 
expression is not based on the intrinsic, pre-political rights of the 
lawyers but the effects on the marketplace of ideas and promotion of 
self-government by the people. With these principles in mind, the 
speech of private, unassociated attorneys should be treated no 
differently from that of their nonprofit colleagues. 
2. Minority Client or Potential Client 
The second factor the Court has emphasized is whether the litigants 
are part of a minority segment of society for whom litigation may be 
the most effective, or only, form of political expression.218 This 
 
 
215   See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 414-15 & n.1-2; Button, 371 U.S. at 419-22 & 
n.5. A full-blown evidentiary examination of the attorneys’ motivations could become 
an unwieldy sideshow and obstacle to litigation, but an affirmation of one’s political 
intent seems a reasonable requirement. 
216 The Supreme Court has previously recognized as a right of association the right 
of a union to disseminate legal information, make referrals to attorneys, collectively 
hire counsel, or negotiate fee agreements for individual members, even where, 
arguably, the litigation did not have a political aim. See generally United Mineworkers 
v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (worker’s compensation); Bhd. of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S 1 (1964) (personal injury claims against employer). I 
would suggest that, in these cases, the Court recognized the activity as protected 
because it concerned federal statutes regulating the social relationship between unions 
and management. One might argue that the union is necessarily a political 
organization, for which the rule should be different than for an attorney or other 
individual not associated with a political organization. Along these lines, one might 
suggest that, for the speech of a lawyer not associated with a political organization to 
be given the highest level of First Amendment protection, the litigation must be aimed 
at disseminating a political message. The problem of course becomes defining that 
category of litigation. 
217 See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 210, at 74. 
218 See Button, 371 U.S. at 431. 
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emphasis reflects political process theory,219 under which judicial 
scrutiny will expand to protect “discrete and insular minorities”220 that 
cannot fairly compete in the political process.221 Under this view, 
because the political process is controlled by majoritarian forces, full 
access for minorities requires the judiciary to ensure that the majority 
does not use its position to disadvantage a minority based on hostility 
or prejudice, and also, the courts take on a special role in clearing 
blocked channels of political change.222 
The litigation-as-expression cases reflect the values of process 
theory. In protecting court-directed expression, the Court was 
interested not so much in resolving the individual grievances of the 
parties but in facilitating minority contributions to public dialogue. 
This may be interpreted as promoting those individuals’ and groups’ 
right to participate equally in self-government223 as well as upending 
targeted obstacles to political change.224 To the extent that one values 
the substantive outcomes as well, it may also be explained as actively 
facilitating public discourse or correcting for failures in the 
marketplace of ideas, so that diverse ideas have the amplification they 
need to reach the public and get vetted.225 
Recognizing litigation as a form of political power over which 
lawyers have a monopoly, and appreciating the barriers minorities face 
in accessing other levers of power, the Court has protected litigation 
to support those lawyers who make the societal contribution of 
ensuring that minority voices can be heard. Combining this 
jurisprudence with the Court’s insight in Velazquez that protecting 
attorneys’ advocacy supports the court’s role in maintaining the 
 
219 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75 
(1980). 
220 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
221 See Tsai, supra note 56, at 871-72 nn.185-87. But see ROSENBERG, supra note 
202, at 10-21, 30-36 (disputing that courts are institutions of social change); Jules 
Lobel, The Political Tilt of the Separation of Powers, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 591, 608 
(David Kairys ed., 1998) (suggesting that separation of powers prevents radical 
change, though it can prevent abuses of power). 
222 Luke P. McLaughlin, The Elysian Foundations of Election Law, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 
89, 99 (2009). 
223 Lobel, supra note 221, at 608 (describing litigation as “expand[ing] the points 
of access to government,” which may be especially important when one branch 
overreaches). 
224 See McLaughlin, supra note 222, at 99. 
225 See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process 
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991) (comparing process theory with notion that 
substantive values justify judiciary’s role in overturning democratically expressed will 
of people). 
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balance of government powers suggests that protecting attorneys’ 
advocacy on behalf of minorities has particular value, and government 
intrusions on it should receive particular scrutiny. In this way, factor 
two mirrors factor five, discussed below, which supports checks on 
abuses of government power. 
An obvious question that remains is how to define the minorities 
who receive special protection. One could draw upon equal protection 
jurisprudence and rely on the accepted categories of suspect classes or 
discrete and insular minorities,226 but, if protecting access to courts is 
designed to correct imbalances in the democratic process, there is a 
fatal flaw in the solution of focusing on such groups. The Achilles’ 
heel of First Amendment theory and justifications for the adversary 
system is that the poor are generally not recognized within the 
category of persons in need of protection.227 Yet, one might argue that 
the poor are far less powerful than any other social group.228 
Turning to the example of Guantánamo highlights this 
contradiction. James Forman argues that some of the detention tactics 
used in the War on Terrorism are strikingly similar to everyday 
practices of the American criminal justice system, and the detainees 
are receiving far better representation.229 Without undercutting the 
importance of the work, or the undeniably grueling conditions, it 
must be admitted that representation of Guantánamo detainees, 
though once a radical project of CCR, has now attracted significant 
numbers of high-profile lawyers who see these cases as high stakes 
litigation. One might argue that, in spite of all the evidence of the 
chilling effects of surveillance, there is no shortage of detainee 
lawyers. In contrast, due to funding constraints that leave poor 
people’s lawyers with enormous caseloads, the “process” most poor 
 
226 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (ruling that “aliens” 
are “prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” warranting “heightened 
judicial solicitude,” and striking down laws conditioning welfare benefits on 
citizenship). 
227 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-29 (1973) 
(refusing to recognize poor as suspect class). 
228 Although the poor have generally not been recognized as a suspect class or a 
discrete and insular minority in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, 
one could argue that the poor have been recognized as such, albeit indirectly, in the 
litigation-as-expression context. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 
535 (2001) (ruling that restriction on speech of poor people’s lawyers violated First 
Amendment, in part because of lack of alternative channels for communication); In re 
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 415-16 (1978) (protecting solicitation as political speech, where 
lawyer sought to represent poor women sterilized as condition of receiving Medicaid). 
229 James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the 
War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 348-59 (2009). 
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Americans receive in “ordinary” criminal cases is so limited by time as 
to be meaningless.230 Further, poor people at risk of losing their 
homes, jobs, and other basics of economic survival are not entitled to 
lawyers, and, unlike the Guantánamo detainees whose cases appeal to 
high-profile volunteers, “ordinary” poor people are expected to 
negotiate the adversary system without representation.231 
Ultimately, assessing and defining the client’s minority status as an 
indicator of whether litigation should be protected as political 
expression depends on the First Amendment value one prioritizes: 
deliberative process or improving the quality of self-government. If 
providing a forum for participation by all citizens (and perhaps 
correcting for failures in the marketplace of ideas) is crucial, then 
litigation on behalf of minorities or otherwise disenfranchised persons 
should receive special attention. Defining this category will then 
require further exploration. If, however, like Professor Blasi, one puts 
a premium on the checking value in the First Amendment, then 
protecting the vulnerable may be less important than protecting those 
in the best position to block governmental abuses of power. For Blasi, 
elites play a special role in the First Amendment. He believes that all 
citizens’ abilities to understand and combat government power depend 
on the intellectual and financial resources of professional critics.232 
Blasi identifies journalists in particular as such critics, but lawyers 
would also fit that role. Even under Blasi’s checking approach, 
however, it may be important to protect litigation on behalf of 
minorities, if one believes those persons are the most likely to be the 
subjects of government abuses of power. They may also be the people 
most likely to lodge radical critiques of it. 
3. Dissident or Unpopular Viewpoint 
Supreme Court precedent has given some support to the checking 
theory, particularly in decisions that have protected litigation that 
advanced a dissident or unpopular viewpoint.233 The Primus Court did 
not consider the status of women or poor people as a disenfranchised 
class, nor did it address explicitly the controversial nature of forced 
sterilization, but it protected solicitation efforts towards such persons, 
 
230 Id. at 364-66. 
231 Id. 
232 Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 541-42. 
233 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 428 (emphasizing ACLU’s role in protecting 
“unpopular causes” and “political dissent”); see also Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 
61, at 527 (prioritizing opposition to governmental abuses of power as key purpose of 
First Amendment). 
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as a form of political expression, based on the importance of 
advocating on behalf of “unpopular causes and [persons].”234 The 
Court generally has not distinguished unpopular or dissident 
viewpoints from unpopular or minority clients, but the categories ought 
to be examined separately because they reflect different emphases with 
respect to First Amendment theory.235 It depends whether the primary 
purpose is to protect the speaker’s autonomy and right of participation 
or the dissemination of information to the community of listeners to 
enable good government. Protecting the unpopular client follows 
process theory in that it aims to increase disenfranchised citizens’ 
access to the deliberative process. Protecting viewpoints, however, 
particularly dissident viewpoints, may be more significant for 
improving the quality of the democratic government, and, in 
particular, safeguarding the checking function of the people. 
Jules Lobel argues that protecting unpopular, dissident viewpoints 
carries distinct value because of the role that courts can play in 
providing opportunities for the expression of dissent when other 
avenues are less potent.236 He suggests that the early Guantánamo 
litigation proved to be a key method of drawing public attention to 
previously neglected aspects of U.S. policy.237 This litigation helped to 
attract media and galvanize a small social movement. While 
knowledge and criticism of U.S. detention policies in Guantánamo 
may seem common now, when CCR first began this litigation, these 
lawyers were advancing a minority view.238 Perhaps, where 
representation falls into both categories — vulnerable clients and 
dissident viewpoints — it raises an additional red flag to protect the 
litigation as expression.239 
 
4. Services Provided Free of Charge 
A key feature of the litigation-as-expression cases has been the 
 
234 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28. 
235 An unpopular, dissident viewpoint could theoretically be advanced on behalf of 
a politically powerful client. As just one example of the distinction, if Philip Morris 
advocated an end to smoking bans, that position would face stiff political opposition, 
though the corporation enjoys financial resources that would allow it to reach 
multiple avenues to disseminate its views. 
236 Lobel, supra note 77, at 479-80. 
237 Id. at 489, 556-60. 
238 See id. at 560. 
239 Primus particularly highlighted the importance of litigation at the nexus 
between unpopular viewpoints and disenfranchised clients. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 
at 427-28. 
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Court’s emphasis on the lawyers’ pursuit of political as opposed to 
remunerative aims. Before concluding that the solicitation in Primus 
constituted political expression entitled to the highest level of First 
Amendment protection, the Court spent considerable time discussing 
the fee agreement between the ACLU and cooperating attorneys, 
highlighting that the case was not one where the income of the 
attorney engaged in solicitation depended on the outcome of the 
litigation.240 In contrast, the same day as it decided Primus, the Court 
issued an opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, in which it held 
that “[i]n person solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment 
is a business transaction,” and a ban on such activity warrants only 
intermediate scrutiny.241 This pair of cases suggests that only unpaid 
litigation, and speech in support thereof, can count as political 
expression. 
Some members of the Court have argued that earning one’s living is 
not necessarily mutually exclusive from pursuing politically expressive 
aims through one’s work. Some have suggested that the mythological 
divide between professionalism and remuneration is largely an artifact 
based in discrimination against certain classes of lawyers and is 
divorced from “the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at 
the bar.”242 Even attorneys employed by political organizations are 
paid; in most cases, the check simply comes from a grant instead of a 
client. Importantly, if there were no finances supporting political 
litigation, it simply could not be sustained.243 In the Guantánamo 
example, one of the difficulties the private pro bono counsel face is 
that the wiretapping has threatened their economic viability by 
interfering with the representation not only of the Guantánamo 
detainees but also of their paying clients. 
In spite of these pragmatic observations, if a primary purpose 
behind recognizing speech in support of litigation is to keep open a 
 
240 Id. at 436 n.30. 
241 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978). 
242 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977). In particular, fee-shifting 
statutes encourage private attorneys general to support the enforcement of laws with 
strong public policy rationales, and many consider such litigation to be classic public 
interest litigation. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on 
Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 241-44 (2003) [hereinafter 
Taking Out the Adversary]; Tsai, supra note 56, at 889-95. 
243 See Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the 
Courts? Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by 
Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 881 (2002); David C. 
Vladeck, In re Arons: The Plight of the “Unrich” in Obtaining Legal Services, in LEGAL 
ETHICS STORIES 255, 261, 284-86 (Deborah L. Rhode & David J. Luban eds., 2006). 
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channel of communication uniquely available to disenfranchised 
persons, this justification may be strongest where the legal services are 
offered free of charge. As Deborah Rhode has pointed out, 
rationalizations for the lawyer’s role as a zealous advocate may lose 
value when partisans are allocated by the market.244 Adding special 
protection for those providing free services may compensate 
somewhat for market forces and help to ensure a wider range of views 
than those the marketplace otherwise would provide in court and 
elsewhere. The absence of a pecuniary incentive might also help to 
reveal whether the motivation of the lawyer is truly political and to 
exclude solicitation from heightened protection where, as in Ohralik, 
the speech coerces a vulnerable client to agree to representation.245 
Admittedly, there may be overzealous public interest attorneys who, 
with political motives rather than financial ones, still have difficulty 
accepting “no” as an answer from a potential client. Yet, hopefully, the 
financial factor should filter out a subset of the most egregious cases. 
Though implementing this factor may become challenging, democratic 
values provide attractive reasons to take into account whether the 
client pays for the adversary work.246 
5. Government Adversary 
Finally, although not always highlighted by the Court, the litigation- 
as-political-expression cases have been grounded, at least implicitly, in 
struggles against legislative or executive power.247 This may be with 
good reason. The functioning of the system of checks and balances 
requires safeguarding the ability of the judiciary to check any excesses 
by the other branches and, arguably, safeguarding lawyers’ ability to 
play their supporting role.248 When litigation aims to bring to the 
judiciary complaints regarding the actions of other government actors, 
efforts by those actors to block the litigation necessarily raise 
 
244 Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 48, at 611-12. 
245 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461. 
246 Another possibility, somewhat more nuanced that the Court’s dichotomy 
between paid and unpaid litigation, might expand the category of highly protected 
litigation to include services offered at a significantly below-market rate, on the basis 
that they compensate for failures in the marketplace, or where legal services are 
compensated under a fee-shifting statute designed to sustain litigation that will correct 
social ills. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy 
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 208-09 (1997) (describing 
legislative intent behind fee-shifting provisions). 
247 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). 
248 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001). 
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significant questions with respect to the functioning of the balance of 
powers.249 As a simple matter of logic, if legislative or executive actors 
can constrict criticisms of their actions, they can directly impede not 
only the marketplace of ideas but also the process of self-government 
by the people. 
Vincent Blasi has emphasized that the abuse of power by a 
government actor brings special dangers,250 and the Guantánamo case 
study provides dramatic examples of this phenomenon. The 
government is not an “ordinary” adversary but rather one with 
extraordinary power over the individual litigant and society as a 
whole. The government has an unparalleled breadth of coercive tools 
at its disposal. 
As described above, the implementation of the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program, and announcements describing its broad contours, have 
reached large swaths of society, both within the United States and 
across borders. The executive and legislative branches of the U.S. 
government have also taken steps beyond wiretapping, which constrict 
the ability of counsel to consult with and obtain evidence on behalf of 
the detainees.251 U.S. officials have blocked in-person attorney-client 
communications. As David Luban documented in Lawfare and Legal 
Ethics in Guantánamo, guards have misrepresented to attorneys that 
clients were uninterested in communicating with counsel, and have 
sown mistrust between detainees and lawyers by disparaging the 
attorneys to their clients and telling the detainees that the attorneys 
are government interrogators.252 In 2007, the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Detainee Affairs condemned the Guantánamo lawyers on 
National Public Radio and suggested that corporate clients should 
boycott their law firms.253 The Deputy had scripted portions of his 
 
249 See id. 
250 Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 538-39. 
251 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (ruling that Congress 
overstepped in Military Commissions Act, which deprived federal courts of 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions for alleged enemy combatants). 
252 J. Wells Dixon reports guards at Guantánamo “routinely informed my clients 
that they have ‘reservations’ — i.e., interrogations [by government agents] — when 
they are actually scheduled to meet with me . . . [and on another occasion,] a military 
officer lied to me directly about a client’s willingness to meet with me.” Dixon Decl., 
supra note 164, ¶ 28. The latter occurred while his client’s case was pending before the 
Supreme Court. id.; see also Luban, Guantánamo, supra note 146, at 1990-91. 
253 Interview by Jane Norris with Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Detainee Affairs 
Charles Stimson (National Public Radio broadcast Jan. 11, 2007) (partial transcript 
available at http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/17/top_pentagon_official_calls_ 
for_boycott) (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Charles 
Stimson announced, “[W]hen corporate CEOs see that [the major law] firms are 
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radio announcement in advance, and it reflected the government’s 
position at that time.254 
The legislature has also taken actions that have limited detainees’ 
access to lawyers and courts. In a “material support” statute that 
criminalizes activities in support of terrorist organizations, Congress 
included the provision of legal expertise within the definition of 
material support and, thereby, cut off certain groups’ access to 
lawyers.255 Congress also directly undercut the power of the judiciary 
by passing legislation that stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus petitions for alleged enemy combatants.256 Questions 
about the government’s intent are beyond the scope of this Article; 
however, examining only the effects, the confluence of these 
government actions appears to interfere with access to counsel and 
courts in a manner that is not only quantitatively, but also 
qualitatively, different than interference that a private actor could 
engender. 
The power of government actors is due, at least in part, to their 
ability to exert legitimized force.257 Beyond the violence imposed on 
the battlefield, the U.S. government has imprisoned hundreds of men 
and deprived them of access to the outside world. In many cases, U.S. 
agents’ ability to thwart attorney-client communications resulted from 
the agents’ physical custody of those clients.258 Agents further 
exploited their position of physical control over the clients by 
subjecting them to physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.259 At the 
same time, the power of the U.S. government to designate the location 
of these prison sites protected the apparent legitimacy of the force 
exerted, at least temporarily. Those sites include not only 
Guantánamo, arguably selected to escape judicial scrutiny,260 but also 
 
representing the very terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 2001, those CEOs 
are going to make those law firms choose between representing terrorists or 
representing reputable firms . . . .”). 
254 Luban, Guantánamo, supra note 146, at 1981-83 (citation omitted). 
255 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2010); id. § 2339B(a)(1). Of course courts 
sometimes sanction the legislature’s actions. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (upholding statute). 
256 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 (striking statute). 
257 Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 538-39. 
258 See Luban, Guantánamo, supra note 146, at 1989-92. 
259 See Report on Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (July 2006), available at http://ccrjustice.org/ 
files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf (summarizing abuse of detainees). 
260 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004) (ruling that court had jurisdiction 
to hear habeas petition of detainee, contrary to position of Executive Branch). 
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scattered CIA outposts intentionally shielded from public view.261 
While these theories of government power are compelling, one 
might find the Guantánamo case study proves too much. The 
dichotomy between governmental and nongovernmental actors is an 
attractive categorical system, due in part to its apparent easy 
application,262 in contrast to that of the other factors described above; 
however, the rationale for the distinction is not completely firm. Many 
cases of litigation against government actors do not involve such dire 
or coercive circumstances for the nongovernmental party. In theory, a 
government always has the power to resort to the use of force, but to 
give speech in support of litigation against government actors special 
recognition, further attention would need to be paid as to how remote 
a possibility of force would be sufficient to trigger the protection. 
Additionally, while governmental powers of intrusion and control can 
reach broadly, this does not make them distinct from those of private 
actors. The government does not have a monopoly on systematic 
power. As a concrete example, in the wiretapping case, the U.S. 
government relied on private telephone companies to conduct the 
surveillance.263 
 
B. Defining the Communications Protected 
The five factors described above highlight the key considerations 
reflected in Supreme Court jurisprudence on litigation as political 
expression, as well as a few of the many inherent challenges of such 
analysis. In addition to identifying the distinguishing features of 
“political” litigation, developing a theory of attorneys’ 
communications in support of litigation as expression will require 
coming to terms with the scope of the communications to be included. 
The Guantánamo example is an atypical example of litigation as 
political expression that does not fit squarely within the model of 
Button-Primus-Velazquez. This section draws attention to three areas in 
which it differs, as they offer three final lessons about the definition of 
litigation as a form of political expression. 
First, one must consider whether fact-gathering communications 
 
261 See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 161. 
262 For purposes of this Article, I have not considered whether litigation on behalf 
of a government entity should be protected as political expression. For an interesting 
examination of government lawyers as cause lawyers, see Steven K. Berenson, 
Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High Profile Lawsuits, 86 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 457, 480-93 (2009). 
263 See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(describing AT&T Corporation’s role in government wiretapping). 
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should be protected as political speech. Button and Primus concerned 
solicitation laws that jeopardized attorneys’ access to potential clients, 
whereas the announced threat of surveillance jeopardizes the 
Guantánamo attorneys’ later communications with clients and other 
sources of information. The exchange of factual information is 
different from discussions of political ideas,264 and one might argue 
that Button and Primus are better cases for recognition of the 
communication as political speech because they concerned direct 
regulation of speech advocating “vindicat[ion of] legal rights” by the 
listener.265 
Yet fact-gathering communications are no less essential than 
solicitation. If the lawyer can only agree to represent clients, but 
cannot conduct any related fact-gathering or theory development, the 
right to litigate becomes close to useless.266 Solicitation occurs first in 
time so the litigation can go forward, but discussing the possibility of 
representation is no more fundamental to the case than factual 
investigation. Imagine if Ms. Primus could solicit clients, but then the 
ACLU lawyers were statutorily barred from communicating with the 
group to learn whether they had been sterilized or whether they 
received Medicaid assistance. Without the facts, the lawyer could not 
draft a complaint, let alone prepare the case for trial.267 
Focusing on the solicitation as the protected speech is too narrow a 
reading of the earlier cases. The political expression is the court- 
directed speech, and the solicitation is simply an extension of it, a 
recognized prerequisite, protected because otherwise the recognition 
of litigation as protected speech would be hollow. The real problem 
with the anti-solicitation law in Button was not simply that it blocked 
the discussion of desegregation, but that it interfered with the 
NAACP’s access to clients needed to challenge desegregation in court. 
The Supreme Court described as the “gravest danger . . . smothering 
 
 
264 But see Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 603, 610 (highlighting 
constitutional significance of accessing information). 
265 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963). Comparing the NAACP member 
to the union member who urges others to utilize federal labor laws and join his union, 
the Court in Button held that encouraging potential plaintiffs to retain the NAACP to 
pursue litigation challenging school desegregation a protected form of advocacy to 
persuade others to vindicate their legal rights. “Free trade in ideas means free trade in 
the opportunity to persuade to action . . . .” Id. (quotation omitted). 
266 See Luban, Taking Out the Adversary, supra note 242, at 245 (describing how 
mechanisms that cripple one side turn adversary system into “farce”). 
267 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001) (describing First 
Amendment right to advise clients of claims and bring those claims to judiciary). 
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all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on behalf 
of the rights of members of an unpopular minority.”268 
The Court has held that solicitation was protected because of its 
relationship to litigation aimed at promoting beliefs and ideas.269 In 
contrast, the same day as it released the Primus opinion, the Court 
issued Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,270 which recognized no First 
Amendment interest in solicitation where the litigation had no 
political motive and the attorney sought only pecuniary gain. 
Particularly given the strong language in both Button and Primus 
regarding the significance of litigation as a form of political expression 
on behalf of dissident clients and causes, the states’ regulation of 
solicitation in those cases is best understood as an indirect yet 
unconstitutional burden on the more highly protected expressive 
activity of courtroom advocacy. 
One might argue that the Supreme Court has previously refused to 
recognize chilling effects on the gathering of information.271 Yet the 
Court in those cases did not credit the factual assertions of chilling 
effects.272 Additionally, that precedent involved journalists and, while 
it is undeniable that journalists play a significant role in American 
democracy,273 it is not outside the realm of possibility that the Court 
would make a different rule for lawyers. In Velazquez, the Court 
emphasized that lawyers have a unique role in supporting the 
functioning of the courts.274 
This still leaves the question of which fact-gathering activities 
should be included within the scope of political expression. The 
 
268 Button, 371 U.S. at 434. 
269 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 (1978). 
270 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978). 
271 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) (noting skepticism about 
chilling effects and risks to journalist’s sources as result of search of newsroom); 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) (“[W]e remain unclear how often and 
to what extent informers are actually deterred from furnishing information when 
newsmen are forced to testify . . . .”); see Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 61, at 602. 
272 See. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566; Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693; see Blasi, Checking 
Value, supra note 61, at 602. 
273 One of the major obstacles to granting extended protections to journalists is the 
difficulty of defining this category of persons. Any individual who created a blog on 
the internet could arguably claim First Amendment protection as a journalist. 
Lawyers, on the other hand, are more easily identified, and more easily held 
accountable for their actions, because they cannot practice without government- 
approved licenses. 
274 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001). Justice Scalia accuses 
the majority of demonstrating “improper special solicitude for our own profession.” 
Id. at 562; see also Barton, supra note 28, at 455 n.4. 
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communications at issue in the Guantánamo case study were primarily 
between lawyers and third parties, not lawyers and clients. While the 
information third parties provide may be just as important to the 
development of a case, stretching the constitutional protection this 
broadly potentially extends the First Amendment protection even 
beyond the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Even defining the 
attorney-client privilege as a First Amendment right could create 
challenges for existing restrictions on it. To go beyond the privilege 
seems almost backwards. 
Yet the concept of recognizing a category of communications 
exceeding the scope of attorney-client privilege is not unprecedented; 
it is reflected in lawyers’ confidentiality obligation. Beyond evidentiary 
and procedural protections, clients also enjoy reassurance of privacy 
provided by rules of ethics that, with the notable crime-fraud 
exception,275 prohibit the lawyer’s release of information acquired in 
the course of representing a client. Confidentiality obligations protect 
a broad scope of information; they apply whenever the lawyer is acting 
in the course of representation. This includes not only 
communications with a client but information gained from any source. 
It even pertains to facts learned accidentally or through observation 
rather than communication, so long as the lawyer is acting in the 
course of representation at the time of discovering the relevant 
information.276 While the lawyer’s ethical obligation of confidentiality 
is based on agency principles277 and therefore may be tied less closely 
to the adversary system than are the attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine, this definition of the confidentiality obligation 
arguably shares the values of that system. It reflects a similarly holistic 
conception of the lawyer’s role and recognizes a critical distinction 
between the lawyer functioning as an advocate and the lawyer 
functioning as a regular citizen. 
Further consideration should be given to the implications of 
recognizing these broad categories of fact-gathering communications 
as protected. Although it does potentially constitutionalize a tidal 
wave of activity, the Supreme Court has already laid the groundwork. 
 
 
275 In the aftermath of the Enron scandals, this area has been an area of some 
movement and controversy. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big 
Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 1 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 335, 339-61 (2008) (describing Enron scandal and subsequent 
alterations of lawyers’ confidentiality obligations). 
276 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1983). 
277 L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 
909, 941-42 (1980). 
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In Primus,278 the Court cited Thomas Emerson’s article on 
associational expression279 to describe the relationship between 
litigation and out-of-court speech essential to it. Emerson explains 
that the concept of freedom of association, invented by the Alabama 
Court, is better understood as derivative of the freedom of expression 
than as an independent right.280 Associational conduct, Emerson 
explains, can amplify and even qualitatively alter expression, and for 
this reason, he maintained that all associational activities intended to 
spread messages farther or more effectively ought to be protected 
based on their expressive purpose.281 He includes conduct like renting 
a concert hall, purchasing supplies, and purchasing sound equipment 
as forms of expressive association, which, although not literally 
speech, should be protected as such.282 Under Emerson’s theory, the 
constitutional problem in the Alabama-Button-Primus trio was that the 
government had infringed on activities necessary to realizing effective 
advocacy. 
Emerson’s approach significantly widens the scope of protection. It 
could potentially lead to a First Amendment right to attorney-client 
privilege, to taking depositions, and to renting a law office. While 
extending the protection to conduct may go too far, the rationale is 
compelling and apparently interested the Primus Court.283 Even if 
extending the protection to conduct seems tenuous, Emerson’s 
perspective supports the notion of broadly protecting speech in 
support of litigation as political expression. 
There remains one final question raised by the Guantánamo case 
study. Even if communications with witnesses were recognized as 
protected speech, the burden on that speech is indirect. Incidental 
burdens on free expression are generally tolerated because of the 
breadth of government activities that would otherwise be subject to 
review.284 Particularly given the potential floodgates described above 
 
278 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978). 
279 Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE 
L.J. 1, 26 (1964). 
280 Id. at 1-2. 
281   Id. at 22. 
282   Id. at 25. 
283 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32. 
284 Some scholars have argued that incidental burdens should receive lesser 
scrutiny, if any, because of the practical impossibly of enacting government regulation 
that creates no incidental burdens. For a thoughtful defense of the constitutional 
relevance of incidental burdens, see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on 
Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1194-98 (1996). See also Cole, supra note 
8, at 7 (arguing that guilt-by-association statutes have chilling effect similar to direct 
 
2011] Towards an Understanding of Litigation as Expression 1541 
 
in defining the factual investigations protected, it is tempting to omit 
consideration of incidental burdens. 
The Supreme Court has recognized incidental burdens on litigation 
in prior cases. Both Velazquez and Alabama may be interpreted as 
cases of indirect burdens on expressive activities of litigation. In 
Velazquez, Congress funded only lawyers who refrained from litigating 
particular claims challenging welfare laws or, in other words, 
representing clients whose cases presented those claims.285 Regulations 
restricted LSC counsel directly, but private attorneys were free to 
pursue such cases, and LSC recipients were free to cease accepting 
LSC funds.286 As a practical matter, however, the funding restriction 
threatened the viability of expression challenging welfare laws, and, 
for this reason, the Supreme Court ruled that the funding restriction 
violated the First Amendment. 
Alabama presents an even more removed relationship between 
government action and a burden on expressive activity.287 The 
Alabama Court determined that the public revelation of NAACP 
members’ and agents’ identities risked exposing them to physical and 
economic harms by other private citizens and, therefore, the state 
court’s disclosure order constituted “unconstitutional intimidation of 
the free exercise of the right to advocate.”288 To reach this conclusion, 
the Court inferred from past acts of reprisal imposed on other 
individuals that future acts would be visited upon current members 
and agents; that, based on knowledge of those acts, African-Americans 
would be discouraged from participating in the NAACP in the future; 
and that the organization’s ability to disseminate its political message 
would thereby be diminished.289 I make no objection to these 
inferences of logic, but the number of them is worth noting. The 
Court’s willingness to recognize the realities facing the NAACP 
underscores the Court’s concern with providing robust protection for 
advocates of political litigation. 
The Court’s willingness to recognize a broad category of 
communications in support of litigation as entitled to First 
Amendment protection as political expression is for good reason. 
Incidental restrictions with a disproportionate burden on protected 
First Amendment activities, such as an ink tax, will trigger First 
 
censorship of subversive speech). 
285 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536-37 (2001). 
286 Id. at 546-47. 
287 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). 
288 Id. at 461-63. 
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Amendment scrutiny.290 How far the incidental burdens analysis 
should extend is beyond the scope of this Article, but the wiretapping 
of lawyers under the TSP, a program which did have a 
disproportionate impact on First Amendment activity, reminds us of 
the importance of the interests at stake. While the scope of protection 
ought not to extend indefinitely, given the long history of 
governments indirectly burdening activity they cannot ban outright, 
recognizing broadly defined incidental burdens may be necessary to 
protect First Amendment freedoms.291 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
As of the date of this publication, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals just handed down a decision allowing a group of lawyers, 
journalists, and others potentially wiretapped under the recent 
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act 
to challenge the constitutionality of such surveillance.292 Following the 
Second Circuit’s ruling that the plaintiffs have standing to proceed, the 
lower court must now face the merits of the claims. This case raises 
First Amendment questions that, up until now in the War on 
Terrorism, courts have avoided. 
The dangers of national security challenge us to grapple seriously 
with the degree of protection we want to accord lawyers’ 
communications in support of their adversary work. This inquiry 
ought to reflect the structure of the American adversary system and its 
philosophical underpinnings. I maintain that the court system and 
lawyers’ work within it promote the same basic values undergirding 
our freedom of speech jurisprudence: individual liberty, the 
marketplace of ideas, and, in particular, self-government. The degree 
of protection we choose to grant to lawyers’ communications reflects 
our commitment to core First Amendment values. 
A line of Supreme Court cases dating back half a century provides 
precedent for defining litigation as political expression, entitled to the 
highest level of First Amendment protection. The more recent 
decision of Velazquez underscores the special expressive role of the 
lawyer in the adversary system. The governmental interest in Button 
and Primus was insubstantial if not illegitimate and Velazquez, while in 
 
290 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 591 (1983). 
291 See sources cited and explanatory parentheticals supra note 271. 
292 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, No. 09-4112-cv, 2011 WL 941524, at *25 (2d 
Cir. Mar. 20, 2011). 
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some ways moving the jurisprudence forward, never explicitly 
embraced the notion of litigation as political. These cases therefore left 
questions about the strength and breadth of protection for litigation as 
expression. 
To explore the contours of the protection for litigation in the face of 
a countervailing government interest more substantial than those in 
Button and Primus, this Article examined a case study of attorneys 
representing Guantánamo detainees under the shadow of warrantless 
wiretapping. The threat of surveillance restricted the lawyers’ ability to 
engage in fact-gathering communications with clients, witnesses, 
experts, and others, as well as to explore legal theories with co-counsel 
and, ultimately, to present evidence and arguments to the courts. The 
obstacles in individual cases arguably created a chilling effect on 
litigation that challenged U.S. policies. 
Viewing the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence in light of the 
Guantánamo case study, five factors emerge as keys to the definition 
of litigation as political expression: (1) whether the attorney or client 
is motivated by a political message; (2) whether the client or potential 
client is a vulnerable minority; (3) whether the litigation advocates an 
unpopular or dissident viewpoint; (4) whether the legal services are 
provided free of charge; and (5) whether there is a government 
adversary on the other side. The example of warrantless wiretapping 
reveals new questions that previous cases have not explored but which 
will now require attention: the constitutional significance of fact- 
gathering, the scope of communications covered, and the degree of 
incidental burdens considered for constitutional review. The 
Guantánamo case study also highlights the First Amendment values 
that underlie the lawyers’ work, thereby reminding us of the 
importance of tackling these doctrinal puzzles with renewed vigor. 
In future research, I hope to explore in more depth the sociological 
implications of recognizing lawyers’ right to engage in 
communications in support of litigation. I imagine that when 
disenfranchised clients face strong opposition, in the form of either 
legal or political obstacles — legal services clients deprived of effective 
counsel by congressional funding restrictions,293 or Guantánamo 
detainees denied access to Article III courts based on their 
characterization as “enemy combatants”294 — lawyers might best serve 
 
293 See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (striking 
down Congressional restrictions that prevented Legal Services attorneys from 
challenging welfare laws). 
294 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (ruling on provision of 
Military Commissions Act that deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas 
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those clients by articulating claims based on their own rights. As our 
history demonstrates, the executive and legislative branches of our 
government have at times stripped vulnerable, unpopular groups of 
legal claims one might previously have understood them to enjoy. I 
predict that even when judges are disinclined to credit the claims of 
despised or disregarded members of society, they might still be 
empathetic to the claims of the lawyers, whom they view as neutral as 
to the moral values of the clients’ actions and aims, and also as 
fulfilling a noble obligation in maintaining that neutrality while 
advancing the clients’ positions. 
If lawyers advance societal interests through their unique role in the 
expression of ideas through litigation, as trustees of justice or officers 
of the court, perhaps they ought to have the enforceable right to bring 
to the attention of the judiciary impositions on their ability to 
advocate. This would require that the lawyers hold their own, 
nonderivative First Amendment rights to express views through 
litigation. It could permit them to challenge limitations on their 
advocacy even if their clients did not have the capacity to bring such 
claims. As the Guantánamo example highlights, if one of the roles of 
the lawyer is to bring claims to the courts so the judiciary can check 
excesses of other branches of government, then instilling lawyers with 
the power to pursue such claims may make sense, because the 
excesses may include stripping clients or potential clients of any 
















corpus petitions for alleged enemy combatants) (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e) (West 
2007)). 
